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Abstract
This paper investigates whether areas isolated from the capital city are less de-
veloped economically in Sub-Saharan Africa. We apply a boundary-discontinuity
design using national borders that divide pre-colonial ethnic homelands to obtain
quasi-experimental variation in distance to the national capital city. Based on night-
lights and geocoded surveys, we find that a one percent increase in distance to the
capital city causes a decrease in the probability of detecting nightlights by 3 percent-
age points and a reduction in household wealth corresponding to 3.5 percentiles of
the national wealth distribution. Our results suggest that a lower provision of public
goods in isolated areas is a key link between remoteness and economic performance.
Despite receiving worse services, people who are isolated exhibit a higher level of
trust in their political leaders. We interpret this as pointing towards dysfunctional
accountability mechanisms that reduce the incentives of state executives to invest
into isolated areas.
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Sandro Provenzano The Cost of Remoteness
1 Introduction
Most African capital cities are located either at or close to the coast. This circum-
stance can be directly linked to colonization. For the Europeans who targeted the
extraction of resources but had little access to the hinterlands, coastal trading points
constituted suitable locations for colonial headquarters. Over the course of the colo-
nial period, these administrative centers flourished and subsequently persisted as
post-colonial national capital cities in modern African states. As a consequence of
having coastal rather than centrally located political centers, large parts of the pop-
ulation live far away from the capital city. Being isolated from the capital might
have important repercussions on their economic performance. As of today, however,
we lack empirical evidence on the role of the location of the capital city with regard
to the spatial distribution of economic activity. Exploiting quasi-random variation
in treatment at national boundaries, in this study, we establish proximity to the
political center within the country, the capital city, as a new important dimension
of economic inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, we provide additional
empirical evidence that links these outcomes to a reduced level of public goods pro-
vision.
Gaining a better understanding of the patterns of local economic development might
be especially helpful in context of Sub-Saharan African growth as the continent still
lags far behind economically and features a very high level of (regional) economic
inequality (International Monetray Fund, 2015). Yet, the ongoing research on the
subject has been largely descriptive (Odusola et al., 2017) rather than seeking to
reveal its underlying patterns and mechanisms. Only a limited number of scholars
(see for example Hodler and Raschky (2014) or Addison et al. (2017)) have examined
spatial patterns and causes of inequality that go beyond the ‘urban-rural bias’ the-
matically (Lipton, 1977; Bates, 1981; Bezemer and Headey, 2008; Pierskalla, 2016).
In this paper, we examine the impact of distance from the capital city on economic
development using a boundary discontinuity design (BDD). We find that a one per-
cent increase in distance from the capital city reduces the probability of a pixel to be
lit by three percentage points (the average probability to be lit is 2.5%) and reduces
household wealth corresponding to 3.5 percentiles of the national wealth distribu-
tion. We show that the effects associated with isolation from the capital city are
unique to isolation from the political center and do not apply to other isolation from
other major cities. This finding supports the view that it is in fact the characteristic
of hosting the political center that is the driving force behind the effects.
Regarding the economic link between isolation from the capital city and economic
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performance, we investigate three potential channels: market access, conflict and
public goods provision. We show that isolation from capital cities, as opposed to
other cities, is linked to a significant drop in the level of public goods provision
suggesting that public goods provision is an important force behind the observed
patterns. In addition, we provide empirical evidence against alternative explanations
related to market access and conflict. With regard to the link between isolation and
a lower provision of public services, we examine two potential mechanisms. Firstly,
isolated populations might be politically underrepresented and marginalized and
thereby unable to secure an equal level of public goods. Secondly, those farther iso-
lated from the capital city might hold politicians less accountable for providing them
with public goods. Regarding the former, we find that while isolated citizens are
less likely to come from the same region as the head of state, they are more likely to
be involved in the ruling coalition in power. Political representation might therefore
play a role with regard to the adverse outcomes of remoteness from the capital city
but it is ambiguous in which direction the effects go. Regarding the accountability
channel, we find that despite being served with a lower level of public goods, people
in isolated areas exhibit a higher level of trust in their national political leadership,
evaluate their performance better and are less likely to believe that their leaders
are corrupt. We interpret this finding as pointing towards dysfunctional feedback
and accountability mechanisms. This view is supported by the observation that
isolated citizens follow the news less frequently and are less likely to advocate for
checks and balances on their leaders in order to hold them accountable for their
actions. Consequently, as people farther away from the capital city tend to have less
information and more confidence in their state leaders, political agents are left with
reduced incentives to provide them with public goods.
The core challenge when seeking to identify the impact of isolation from the cap-
ital city is the fact that capital cities are not randomly located in space. There
are numerous geographical characteristics, most notably isolation from the coast,
that are simultaneously correlated with isolation from the capital city and economic
performance and thus confound ordinary regressions. We overcome this obstacle
by applying a boundary discontinuity design across national boundaries and com-
paring places with otherwise similar geographical features but varying distances to
their respective capital city. Moving across the boundary might not constitute a
valid counterfactual if the switch between countries coincides with other variables
that might themselves be linked with development such as ethnicity and culture. We
therefore restrict our analysis to boundary segments that divide pre-colonial ethnic
homelands into two adjacent countries with different capital cities. Regarding the
data input, we combine various remote sensing data sources such as VIIRS (Visible
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Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite) nightlights and use geocoded survey data from
the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the Afrobarometer.
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition of our identification strategy. The figures presents
the VIIRS nightlights from 2016 for pixels of around 0.5 km × 0.5 km in the 25
km boundary area of the Nyanja ethnic homeland that is divided into two adjacent
countries, Malawi and Mozambique. We observe that the Malawian side contains
more lit pixels and features an overall higher average light density indicating that the
Malawian side is more advanced economically. The Mozambiquian side is located
1,262 km from its capital city Maputo, while the Malawian side is situated only 251
km from its capital city Lilongwe. Our identification strategy aims at exploiting this
jump in distance from the capital city to explain differences in economic outcomes.
Figure 1: Nyanja Ethnic Homeland Partitioned between Malawi and Mozambique
(a) Lit vs. Not-Lit Pixels (b) Mean Light Density
Previous research on the determinants of regional development has provided am-
ple evidence that local geographical factors have had major impact on the level
of economic prosperity today. Nunn and Puga (2012) find that while ruggedness
generally constitutes a burden for economic development, it protected relatively
rugged countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from the negative long-run implications of
the transatlantic slave trade such as reduced levels of trust (Nunn and Wantchekon,
2011). Other research points out that historical institutional framework conditions
such as pre-colonial ethnic institutions are a key factor for economic development
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). Hodler and Raschky (2014) and Burgess
et al. (2015), in turn, show that political factors such as the ethnic affiliation of
the incumbent president plays an important role for regional economic growth. The
authors document that under weak political institutions, public investments and eco-
nomic growth are biased in favor of the president’s home region. Thus, these studies
clearly underline that research on comparative development needs to go beyond the
national level and occupy itself with subnational patterns. Moreover, political mech-
anisms are a key determinant of comparative regional development. These insights
are especially relevant in the African context where states have not grown together
as one over the centuries and feature very high levels of heterogeneity and ethnic
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fractionalization.
Only a small set of papers have looked at the role of the location of the capital
city for economic outcomes. Campante and Do (2014) investigate a concept related
to this study, namely, the implications of capital cities that are relatively isolated
from their respective population. For the sample of US states, the authors find that
states with isolated capital cities exhibit higher levels of corruption and lower levels
of accountability and public goods provision. Campante et al. (2019) study capital
city isolation in a worldwide sample and find that non-democracies (as opposed to
democracies) with relatively isolated capitals tend to be associated with misgover-
nance. Unfortunately, both studies leave the implications of isolated capital cities
on economic development untouched. In the Sub-Saharan African context, the im-
portance of the location of capital cities and their limited (institutional) outreach
into the hinterlands were theoretically established by Herbst (2000) and empiri-
cally investigated by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013). The authors find that
national instutions are an important predictor for economic performance in areas
relatively close to capital cities but lose their effect in areas farther away. However,
the authors leave the economic consequences of isolation from the capital city as
well as their impact on public good provision concealed.
The remainder of this paper is organized into six sections. Firstly, Section 2 will
introduce the sample and datasets and establish the empirical identification strat-
egy. Secondly, Section 3 will present our empirical results. In Section 4, we conduct
a number of robustness tests. Subsequently, in Section 5, we examine the role of
public goods provision as mediator between isolation from the capital city and eco-
nomic performance. In Section 6, we provide additional evidence against alternative
potential explanations. Finally, Section 7 will summarize the findings and conclude
the paper.
2 Empirical Strategy and Data
2.1 Sample
This study examines isolation from the capital city in Sub-Saharan Africa consisting
of 48 countries. However, as the effects of isolation from the capital city are likely
to be fundamentally different in (small) island states like Cape Verde, Comoros, Sa˜o
Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe and Madagascar, we exclude these countries from our sample.
We also exclude Sudan and South Sudan due to their recent seperation, as well as
Somalia and Somaliland due to the abscense of a stable political power in Somalia
and the special role of the government in Somaliland (Eubank, 2012). Furthermore,
4
Sandro Provenzano The Cost of Remoteness
we exclude South Africa as it has subdivided its three branches of government into
three seperate capital cities (Pretoria, Bloemfontein and Cape Town as the execu-
tive, judicial and legislative capital respectively). Lastly, we omit Lesotho as it does
not share a boundary with any remaining country in the sample. As a result, we
are left with a sample of 38 countries as is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: VIIRS Nightlights Sample
Figure 2 presents the locations of the capital cities (blue stars). For the most part,
this assignment is uncontroversial as the majority of capital cities have persisted as
such since the colonial era. The exceptions are Ivory Coast and Nigeria where the
capital city was ultimately shifted in 1983 from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro and in
1991 from Lagos to Abuja respectively. Tanzania has also been planning to move its
capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma since 1973. However, up until 2019, only the
Tanzanian parliament has relocated to their new headquarter while Dar es Salaam
has remained the de-facto seat of the president. We, therefore, keep Dar es Salaam,
instead of the new official capital, Dodoma, as national capital of Tanzania.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of isolation from the capital city for the countries
under investigation. It becomes clear that isolation from the capital city is not just a
phenomenon that only affects small minorities but with a median of 303 km (mean:
391 km) rather represents the common case.
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Figure 3: Isolation from the Capital City - Overview
Note: This figure is based on own calculations using the UN-adjusted population density grid for the year 2015 by
Worldpop. It displays the density distribution of isolation from the capital city for our sample countries. Please
note that this figure includes the population within a range of 20 km from the capital city that is omitted by default
from all estimations (see Section 2.4). Each bar represents an intervall of 25 km. The upper limit of isolation from
the capital city is 2075 km. The average person lives 391 km (median: 303 km) away from the capital city.
2.2 Measuring Economic Performance Locally
In order to examine the impact of distance from the capital city, we require informa-
tion on economic activity for small spatial units. Since reliable administrative data
on the local level is not available in Sub-Saharan Africa, we use the 2016 VIIRS
nighttime light density as our main measure for local economic performance. Addi-
tionally, in order to cross-validate our findings and address potential shortcomings
of nighttime lights (see below), we complement our analysis using the survey-based
DHS wealth index.
Nighttime Lights (VIIRS):
The use of nighttime luminosity data as a proxy for economic activity has greatly
increased in recent years. The data has been especially useful for places where na-
tional accounts data on GDP is of poor quality, as well as for (small) geographical
units where administrative data is simply not available. Several studies have in-
vestigated and validated the consistency of nighttime lights as a proxy for GDP.
These studies compare GDP estimates from nighttime lights with administrative
data for places where both is available. Henderson et al. (2012) show that their
estimation for income growth on the national level for a set of 30 countries differed
by only up to 3.2% from the actual data. Moreover, Hodler and Raschky (2014:
1030) show for sub-national admin-1 regions across the world that “the relationship
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between nighttime lights and GDP is linear and thereby similar across regions with
different nighttime light intensity and income levels”. Comparing nighttime lights
to the wealth index for geocoded DHS respondents in Africa, Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2013: 122) show that the relationship even holds on the local level.
These findings underline that the mechanisms that drive the positive relationship
between economic activity and nighttime light emissions are stable across regions
and observational units. This also explains why nighttime lights have become so
popular among researchers in spatial microeconometric settings.
However, nighttime lights are also subject to limitations. First of all, the relationship
between nighttime light density and economic activity on the local pixel level is non-
linear (Henderson et al., 2012). As a primary step, it therefore helps to log-transform
nightlight intensity in order to obtain a more uniform distribution and reduce the
weight of outliers. Moreover, we can adress the concern about the precise functional
form by running each regression using an extensive measure of nightlights:
• Intensive approach (the intensity of nightlights using a log-transformation1):
Yi = ln(Lightsi + 0.002000212) (1)
• Extensive approach (the extent to which cells are lit or not lit):
Yi =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1 if Lightsi > 00 if Lightsi = 0 (2)
Secondly, Chen and Nordhaus (2011) and Cogneau and Dupraz (2014) point out that
the predictive power of nightlights for economic activity is low and noisy for areas
of low population and nightlight density. In particular, the ongoing electrification
process in Sub-Saharan Africa might confound our estimated relationship between
economic activity and remoteness from the capital city. Therefore, attributing the
differences between (recently) electrified areas and non-electrified areas to differ-
ences in the distance to the capital city might overestimate the actual difference in
economic activity. The obstacle is that electrification and economic development are
mutually dependent and hard to disentangle. On the one hand, since the returns
to electrification are higher in economically more dynamic areas, public decision
makers likely prioritize such areas. On the other hand, electrification is itself at
least a moderate driver of economic growth (Dinkelman, 2011; Burlig and Preonas,
2016). In a BDD model, electrification as a potential confounding factor is less of
a concern as electricity grids often span across boundaries. Moreover, the concern
1Since the vast majority of pixels has a light density of 0, we add the minimal observed light density
that is greater than zero as a constant term before taking the natural logarithm. The results are
stable with regard to alternative added constant terms and hold when for example using 0.0001
or 0.001 instead.
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that electrification confounds the estimated relationship rests upon the assumption
that the electricity grid expands from the capital city. Yet, this assumption is not
in line with the observation that selected cities all around our sample countries emit
nightlights. Consequently, electrification is unlikely a major confounder in our mod-
els. However, under certain assumptions, we might be overestimating the economic
impact of isolation from the capital city. As electrification is endogenous, rather
than including it as a ‘bad control’, we cross-validate our findings using the DHS
wealth index as a more concrete alternative measure of economic development.
We combine the nightlights with a wide range of geographical covariates from var-
ious remote sensing data sources as is described in Section A.1 in more detail. For
the purpose of curbing measurement error and mismatching resulting from small in-
accuracies between the datasets and to facilitate the computational intensity of the
analysis, the data grids are aggregated to a resolution of 75 × 75 arcseconds which
is equivalent to approximately 2.3 × 2.3 kilometers at the equator. The nightlight
grids have an initial resolution of 15 × 15 arcseconds which means that 25 original
pixels (5×5) constitute a new pixel and inherit the average value of its predecessors.
This leaves us with around 3.5 million pixels for the 38 countries in our sample. In
order to be able to stack nighttime lights and other geographical covariates together,
we interpolate all other grids bilinearly to match the nightlight grid resolution. We
further transform our grids from the standard decimal degree CRS ‘WGS 84’ to
‘Africa Sinusoidal’ which properly maps distances in Sub-Saharan Africa using the
metric system.2
Wealth Index (DHS):
The DHS (Demographic and Health Surveys Program) is implemented by ICF In-
ternational and funded by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). Since 1984, the program has collected nationally representative data on so-
ciodemographic, economic and health characteristics through more than 400 surveys
in over 90 developing and emerging economies including 30 out of the 38 countries
in our sample. Aside from the extensive geographical and temporal coverage of the
DHS, the advantage of the DHS is that most of its surveys use GPS receivers to
record a household’s longitude and latitude coordinates which makes the DHS well
suited for geospatial analyses.3 We use the most current household recode survey
available for each available country and illustrate the DHS sample in Figure A1a.
2See http://spatialreference.org/ref/esri/africa-sinusoidal/ for more information.
3Please note that in order to protect the privacy of respondents, the DHS displaces the GPS
coordinates randomly up to 2 km for urban clusters and up to 5 km for rural clusters with 1% of
rural clusters being displaced up to 10 km. This displacement is restricted such that respondents
always stay within the same country and region.
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Based on a household’s ownership of selected assets (such as car, bicycle, refriger-
ator, computer, television) and household facilities (such as roof and floor material
or type of toilet facility), the DHS estimates a household’s ‘wealth index’ using
principal component analysis (PCA).4 Since the PCA is conducted for each survey
(country and year) seperately, the index represents a composite measure of a house-
hold’s cumulative living standard relative to other households within each country
and year. This circumstance limits the applicability of the indicator as measures of
absolute wealth between countries or over time are not consistent. Yet, the indicator
is perfectly suitable for applications that seek to understand the relative distribution
of living standards within countries. We standardize the wealth index for each sur-
vey to make a household’s wealth index more comparable to the relative position of
households in other countries. As a second alternative measure, we rank and assign
each household its relative position in the national wealth distribution. While the
second measure loses valuable information regarding the absolute difference between
two consecutive housholds, its interpretation is more intuitive as differences between
housholds can be expressed in terms of percentile changes within the national wealth
distribution.
2.3 Further Data Sources for the Channel Analysis
Afrobarometer Survey Data:
The Afrobarometer surveys comprise questions on household characteristics, public
goods, public perception, as well as political attitudes and opinion. The surveys are
conducted every few years in most African countries and provide the geolocation of
their respondents which makes it highly suitable for studies in economic geography.
We use rounds 5, 6 and 7 of the Afrobarometer covering 26 out of the 38 countries
in our sample as is illustrated in Figure A1b. The data is available upon application
at: https://www.afrobarometer.org.
The Afrobarometer is especially useful to investiage the spatial pattern of public
goods provision as it contains information on whether the enumeration area (clus-
ter) in which the respondent is located is supplied with certain public goods: paved
road, electricity grid, piped water system and sewage system. Moreover, based on
the Afrobarometer, we can examine how distance from the capital city affects cor-
ruption perception, trust into the political leadership, news readership and other
characteristics reflecting how people think about their leaders and the political or-
ganization of their country. A complete list of all Afrobarometer survey questions
and indicators can be found in Section A.1.
4For more information about the construction of the DHS wealth index and which variables and
weights are used in each respective country and year please visit: https://dhsprogram.com/topic
s/wealth-index/Wealth-Index-Construction.cfm.
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Access to Power:
In order to explore whether areas close and far from the capital city are, conditional
on their respective population shares, equally represented in the government, we
require a dataset on the origins of state executives. Francois et al. (2015) create
an extensive dataset on the ethnicity of cabinet ministers in African countries since
independence. Based on their analysis, the authors are able to infer that ruling
coalitions are large and ethnicities represented proportionally. However, the authors
do not study if geographical locations are equally represented. Since their dataset is
not geocoded and there exists no complementary dataset that corresponds to their
categorization of ethnic groups, we are unable proceed with their database. For
this reason, we limit our analysis to the heads of state using and supplementing the
database by Dreher et al. (2016: 40-41). We update this list regarding the period of
office and region of origin up to the year of 2016 using publicly available information
from various sources including Wikipedia.
Yet, solely mapping out the origins of heads of state might be imprecise and not
give a holistic image about an area’s access to power. Therefore, we complement the
analysis with a second dataset comprising the degree of access to power for various
politically relevant ethnic groups from 1946 to 2017: the Ethnic Power Relations
Core Dataset 2019 (EPR) (Vogt et al., 2015). The advantage of the EPR dataset is
that it can be combined with a complementary dataset on the geolocation (polygons)
of the respective ethnic groups (Wucherpfennig, 2011). The EPR status indicators
categorizes groups as in power : ‘monopoly’, ‘dominance’, ‘senior partner’, ‘junior
partner’ as well as excluded groups: ‘powerless’, ‘discrimination’, ‘self-exclusion’ and
areas that have are not been identified as being politically relevant which are coded
as irrelevant. To obtain an image of contemporary patterns, we restrict the dataset
to the period 2000-2017. We assign each pixel the total number of years in each
respective status category as our variable of interest. Since some of the groups are
overlapping geographically, we assign each area the status of the respective most
powerful group.
Conflict Data (ACLED):
In order to investigate whether conflict is a relevant channel linking remoteness from
the capital city and economic development, we use the Armed Conflict Location &
Event Data (ACLED) containing the geolocation of conflicts between 1997 and today
by type: ‘violent events’, ‘demonstration events’ and ‘non-violent action’ (Raleigh
et al., 2010). For more information on the definition of different conflict types please
refer to the ACLED homepage at: https://www.acleddata.com/resources/general-g
uides/. Our conflict event sample comprises 88,853 instances between 01.01.2000
and 27.11.2019 distributed all over our sample countries.
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2.4 Identification
Intuition and construction of the BDD Model:
The most intuitive way to assess the effect of isolation from the capital city5 on
local economic development is a simple univariate analysis. In Figure 4, we plot the
share of lit pixels over distance from the capital city. The graph reveals that, on
average, the probability of detecting nightlights in a pixel decreases exponentially
with distance from the respective capital city. Unfortunately, this correlation is hard
to interpret as it is shaped by a variety of confounders. Most notably, isolation from
the capital city is correlated with a range of location-specific geographical factors,
that are themselves determinants of economic performance. For instance, African
capitals tend to be located at the coast which means that proximity to capital cities
concurrently translates into the advantages of proximity to ports and international
trade (Henderson et al., 2017). Moreover, it is highly doubtful whether the rela-
tionship actually reverses for very high distance as is indicated by a slightly positive
slope starting at around 1,250 km. It is more likely that these pixels just happen
to be in economically more dynamic areas such as the mining areas in the South-
Eastern part of DR Congo. Hence, local economic framework conditions such as
endowments with natural resources or local institutions and culture (Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou, 2013) confound the estimated relationship as well. Consequently,
simple univariate analyses are highly problematic and do not allow to draw defini-
tive conclusions about the causal impact of remoteness from the capital city.
One way of addressing these shortcomings would be explictly modelling all relevant
relationships by including a wide set of geographical covariates as well as country
and ethnic homeland characteristics into the model. In the next step, we therefore
include: distance from the coast, elevation, ruggedness, the pixel surface covered with
water, annual mean temperature, average minimal temperature in the coldest month,
average maximal temperature in the warmest month, caloric suitability index, annual
precipitation, latitude, longitude as geographical characteristics, Xi, for each pixel
i and absorb country and ethnic characteristics through fixed effects: bc and be.
We log-transform distance to the capital city using the natural logarithm, CAPi, in
order to account for the exponential relationship suggested by Figure 4.6 Equation
5We measure isolation from the capital city as the Euclidean distance between a location (a pixel)
and the respective capital city. A drawback of this measure, as opposed to more sophisticated
travel time or travel cost estimates, is that it is less precise. However, measures that take into
consideration the infrastructure development would induce reverse causality bias. This is due to
the fact that places that are more dynamic economically tend to be better connected and are
therefore closer to the capital city in terms of travel time. Combes and Lafourcade (2005: 346)
underline the consistency of our metric by showing that simple distance measures “do a very good
job in capturing transport costs in cross-section analysis”.
6The qualitative intuition behind the log-transformation is that the effects of isolation from the
11
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Figure 4: Isolation from the Capital City - Nighttime lights
Note: This figure plots the share of lit pixels over distance from the capital city. Please note that this figure includes
the population within a range of 20 km from the capital city that is omitted by default from all estimations (see
Section 2.4). Each bar represents an area of 75 km.
3 illustrates the respective model equation where Yi denotes the outcome variable
referring to our measures of Nightlight Density in pixel i.
Yi = βCAPi + γXi + bc + be + εi (3)
Yet, since we usually only control for a subset, Xˆi, of all relevant location-specific fac-
tors (Xi = Xˆi+X˜i), CAPi remains endogenous with εi = X˜i+ui and E(εi|CAPi) =
0. As a result, OLS-estimations based on Equation 3 are usually biased and do not
allow for causal inference.
We, therefore, require an estimation approach where omitted relevant location-
specific characteristics, X˜i, are balanced by construction. A tangible solution is
to establish counterfactuals in a BDD model. The idea is that African borders were
arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers and divide pre-colonial ethnic homelands
with similar geographical, social and historical traits (Michalopoulos and Papaioan-
nou, 2016). For areas very close to the boundary the assignment to a particular
country and its respective capital city can consequently be interpreted as acciden-
tal. Hence, national borders constitute an arbitrary cutoff at which we can obtain
capital city are decreasing with distance from the capital city. Yet, given that the relationship
in Figure 4 is strongly confounded and should therefore be taken with caution, we confirm the
adequacy of the log-transformation statistically based on the Akaike information criteria applied
to our more sophisticated BDD model.
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a quasi-random jump in distance from the capital city. However, as opposed to
Basten and Betz (2013) or Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014), simply pooling
areas around boundaries does not remove the heterogeneity in (un-)observables with
respect to the treatment intensity. This circumstance is due to the fact that, as op-
possed to country-wide indicators, isolation from the capital city is autocorrelated
i.e. evolves gradually along the boundary which induces a cross-border correlation.
This, in turn, causes a spurious relationship between isolation from the capital city
and other autocorrelated (un-)observable location-specific factors that concurrently
gradually evolve along both sides of the boundary.
For example, when considering the national boundary between Ghana and Togo
(see Figure 5), distance from the capital city increases for both sides from South to
North. The problem is that (un-)observable factors such as distance from the coast
or climatic conditions simultaneously evolve along the boundary. As a consequence,
if we simply pool boundary areas, we are unable to distinguish whether potential dif-
ferences in outcomes are driven by isolation from the capital city or (un-)observable
geographical factors such as a larger distance from the coast and/or drier climate.
Figure 5: The Ghana-Togo Border
(a) Accurate Map - Boundary Area (b) Schematic Map - Border Segments
In order to overcome this problem, we need to isolate the exogenous variation in
distance to the capital city that is induced by arbitrary boundaries using a more
elaborate BDD model. The solution is to subdivide shared national boundary areas
into smaller segments. In Figure 5, s1-s11 sketch such segments for the example of
the Ghana-Togo border schematically. Applying segment fixed effects absorbs the
location-specific characteristics of each segment. In other words, these fixed effects
partial out anything that equally exists on either side of the boundary. Hence, we
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are left with the differences between both sides of a boundary segment: a switch in
the country and hence the institutional environment that all pixels within a country
have in common and which we can therefore absorb using country fixed effects,
and a jump in distance from the capital city which we can exploit to study the
impact of isolation from the capital city. In Section A.1 we formally show that,
under the assumption that (un-)observable location specific characteristics do not
differ systematically across the boundary, this procedure is equivalent to taking the
difference between counterfactual segment sides. Essentially, this procedure thereby
cancels out all (un-)observables location-specific characteristics and allows us to
obtain unbiased causal estimates. To satisfy the assumption of balancedness in (un-
)observables across the border, we reduce our sample to a small buffer of 25 km
around those boundary segments that partition ethnic homelands and entirely nest
each segment within one partitioned ethnic homeland p. Thereby, this procudure
does not only balance geographical covariates7 but also historic political and cultural
framework conditions. Furthermore, we include polynomials of our running variable
Distance from the Boundary in km (DFB) for each ethnic homeland in each country
separately into our model. These polynomials pick up any potentially remaining
heterogeneity within segments. As a result, we essentially analyze how a pixel would
have performed economically if the imposed boundary line had been shifted by a few
kilometers such that the pixels were on the other side of the border within the same
ethnic homeland and the same local economic conditions but with the respective
other distance from the capital city. Hence, the BDD model with segment fixed
effects in Equation 6 allows us to effectively control for (un-)observed heterogeneity
with regard to the treatment intensity and thereby facilitates the isolation of causal
estimates.
Yi = βCAPi + ϕXi + bc + bs +
3∑
n=1
λn,c,pDFB
n
i + ξi (4)
Further technical details:
In order to identify boundary segments that partition ethnic homelands, we use
the ethnographic ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ on pre-colonial ethnic homelands by Mur-
dock (1959) that is widely used in economics when marking out different ethnicities
(Nunn, 2008; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, 2014, 2016). Murdock subdi-
vides the entire African continent into 843 distinc polygons that each relate to a
7Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014: 171) provide an in-depth discussion about the origin of
Sub-Saharan African national boundaries and conclude that “differences in geography-ecology,
location, and natural resources across the border within partitioned ethnic homelands are small
and not systematically linked to differences in national institutions” (Ibid.: 172). Conducting a
range of balancing tests, we validate that local (un-)obversable characteristics are also balanced
with respect to isolation from the capital city.
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local ethnic majority group. The map refers roughly to the era around the Berlin
Conference and the establishment of artificial African boundaries. This circum-
stance makes this map well suited for our purpose as it is free from more recent
potentially endogenous migration movements. Moreover, “case study and anecdotal
evidence suggest that in spite of population movements ethnic populations tend to
reside in their respective historical homelands” (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2014: 162). Since Murdock’s map was originally printed in his book and only later
digitized, there might be some inaccuracies with the precise delimination of ethnic
homelands (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013: 143). To account for this po-
tential shortcoming, we restrict each ethnic homeland by (a negative buffer of) -15
km prior to further processing the map.
In the next step, we subdivide all national borders that divide ethnic homelands
into segments of 50 km length with a buffer of 25 km (15km, 50 km in sensitivity
tests) on each side of the boundary. To verfiy that segments are sufficiently small
and homogenous, we conduct a range of balancing tests. In our econometric model,
we implicitly assume that both segment sides are of equal size. However, in practice,
since national borders are not always straight lines, opposing segment sides are not
of equal size in all instances either. Therefore, we weight each pixel such that both
segment sides have the same aggregated weight.8
For the purpose of preventing that inaccuracies and blooming confound the assign-
ment of nightlights to a segment side (country), we exclude pixels whose centroid
is within a range of 3 km (1.5 km in sensitivity tests) from the boundary from all
estimations. Further, to account for uninhabitable areas, we exclude pixels that are
entirely covered with water or are completely unpopulated. Additionally, in order to
ensure that the estimates of isolation from the capital city are not simply capturing
the break between the capital city and the hinterland, we exclude pixels within a
radius of 20 km (but also 50 km, 75 km and 100 km in sensitivity tests) around the
capital city (and placebo city) by default from all estimations.
Last but not least, a potential caveat might stem from the circumstance that isola-
tion from the capital city always simultaneously means isolation from a major city
and market. In order to affirm that it is in fact isolation from the political center
that is driving the effects of isolation from the capital city, we run placebo tests. The
idea is that if hosting the political center is in fact the key characteristic of capital
cities with respect to the effects under scrutiny, then the effects of isolation from
8We maintain the overall weight of segments relative to each other (proportional to their total
segment size). Further, in order to avoid overrepresenting very small segment sides, if a segment
side contains less than 20 pixels, we drop the entire segment.
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other major cities within the country should be fundamentally different. For this
purpose, we create PLC, representing the log of distance from the placebo city (in
km), as a new variable. A placebo city is defined as the largest city within the coun-
try if the capital city is not the largest city and the second largest city otherwise.9
We then include PLC into Equation 6 and compare the estimated coefficients for
capital and placebo city isolation. However, this placebo test might be confounded
by the fact that capital cities tend to be the largest city within the country. To this
end, we decompose the effect of isolation from a city into a city type (capital vs.
placebo city) and city size effect (big vs. small city in terms of city population). We
do so by partialing out the size effect by additionally including interactions between
CAP and PLC with their respective population counts.
Yi = β1CAPi + τ1CAPi × Popcap,c + β2PLCi + τ2PLCi × Popplc,c
+ ϕXi + bc + bs +
3∑
n=1
λn,c,pDFB
n
i + 	i (5)
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 OLS
The results of the OLS estimations based on Equation 3 for a variety of alterna-
tive specifications can be found in Table 1. Columns (1)-(4) refer to the extensive
approach (see Equation 2), whereas columns (5)-(8) refer to the intensive approach
(see Equation 1). Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) correspond to the simple OLS models
while columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) include ethnic homeland fixed effects.10 Further,
columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) are restricted to the boundary area within 25 km from
the border.11
As becomes clear from the table, irrespective of the precise model specification, iso-
lation from the capital city is significantly negativly related to both the probability
and the intensity with which a pixel is lit. A one percent increase in distance from
the capital city, on average, decreases the probability that a pixel is lit by around
1.5 percentage points and the nightlight density by around 0.07 percent. Figure A5
presents the respective OLS estimates conducted for each country separately. Fig-
ure A5a compares the estimates of the full sample to those of the boundary sample
using extensive nightlights corresponding to columns (1) and (2). Likewise, Figure
9In order to avoid collinearity with the capital city, we further require the placebo city to be at
least 50 km away from the capital city.
10Note that since the ethnic homeland fixed effects do not only embrace partitioned ethnicities
they naturally induce a high level of collinearity with isolation from the capital city.
11Note that the boundary area models with ethnicity fixed effects are actually less rigourous hybrids
between OLS and BDD estimations.
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A5b corresponds to the intensive margin corrsponding to columns (5) and (6). The
figures underline that while the aggregated coefficients in the OLS models in Table 1
appear relatively stable, the estimated effects on the country level are very sensitive
to alterations in the model specification. This finding suggests that the OLS results
are subject to substantial bias and should be taken with caution.
Table 1: OLS Results
Dependent variable:
Probability Pixel is Lit Log Light Density
in 2016 (VIIRS) in 2016 (VIIRS)
OLS Ethnicity FE OLS Ethnicity FE
All Border All Border All Border All Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Distance from -0.020∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
the Capital City (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024)
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Ethnicity FE NO NO 706 351 NO NO 706 351
Observations 3,518,146 416,667 3,518,146 416,664 3,518,146 416,667 3,518,146 416,664
R2 0.080 0.082 0.131 0.134 0.069 0.069 0.126 0.121
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.082 0.130 0.133 0.069 0.069 0.126 0.120
Note: This table reports OLS and boundary area regression results based on Equation 3. In order to avoid capturing
the break between the capital city and the hinterlands, we exclude 20 km around each capital city from our sample.
To prevent misassignment of detected nightlights between countries due to blooming, we exclude 3 km on each
side of the border. The boundary area regressions (‘Border’) are restricted to all pixels with centroids within the
range of 25 km from shared national borders. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km),
ruggedness (in % slope), % surface covered with water, mean annual temperature, minimum average temperature
during the coldest month, maximum average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C), crop caloric index,
annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km). The ‘Ethnicity FE’ are based on the ethnic
homelands in the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by ethnic
homeland. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The associated balancing tests, for the example of distance from the coast, can be
found in Table A6. In the least restrictive models (columns (1) and (5) in Table 1
and column (1) in Table A6), a one percent increase in isolation from the capital city
is correlated to an increase in isolation from the coast by around 18 percent of the
sample mean. This imbalance decreases to around 4 percent for the most restrictive
models (columns (4) and (8) in Table 1 and column (4) in Table A6). While these
results signal that the implemented OLS model restrictions towards the BDD model
are effective in tackling heterogeneity in (un-)observables, the imbalances still remain
relatively high. And, since we cannot be sure to be controlling for all relevant
location-specific factors, the results of the OLS approach are rather descriptive than
causal.
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3.2 Border Discontinuity Graphs
In the next step, the goal is to overcome the imbalance in location-specific charac-
teristics with respect to the treatment intensity of isolation from the capital city.
Yet, prior to moving to the most elaborate BDD model based on Equation 6, we
undertake a simplified, yet more intuitive, graphical approach.
We begin by subdividing all national boundaries into segments of 50 km line lenght
with a buffer of 50 km on either side (see A2 for an illustrative map).12 Each seg-
ment side belongs to a different country (and capital city). Next, we determine
the average distance to the capital city for each segment side and assign them into
the group ‘close’ if they are relatively closer to their capital city as their opposing
boundary segment and into the group ‘far’ otherwise. Through this procedure, we
obtain two groups that are balanced with respect to location-specific covariates but
with systematically different distances from their respective capital cities. Thereby,
this procedure enables us to assess the impact of crossing the boundary from ‘far’
to ‘close’ to the capital city on nightlight density while keeping geographical factors
constant.
Figure 6: Boundary Discontinuity Graphs
(a) Extensive (b) Intensive
Note: The graphs illustrate the graphical BDD. The grey buffer around the lines represent the 95% confidence
intervall. The bins on the left-hand side are, with an average distance of 830 km, relatively far from the capital city
and represent a total of 241,241 pixels. In contrast, pixels on the right-hand side are, with an average of around 430
km, relatively close to the capital city and represent 238,908 pixels.
Figure 6 plots the border discontinuity graphs with 6a referring to the extensive and
6b to the intensive scale of nightlights. Areas on the left are on average 830 km and
areas on the right 430 km away from the capital city. The graph indicates a large
jump of around 25% in the probability with which pixels are lit when moving from
relatively remote to areas near the capital city.
12To obtain balanced subgroups, we drop segments where the minimum distance from the border
on either side is greater than 5 km or the maximum distance less than 45 km (which occurs mostly
around very uneven boundaries). This reduces our sample from 729,093 to 480,149 pixels.
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Figure 7: Discontinuity Balancing Graphs: Capital City
(a) Distance from Coast (b) Mean Temperature (c) Min Temperature
(d) Max Temperature (e) Ruggedness (f) Elevation
(g) Latitude (h) Longitude (i) Precipitation
(j) Crop Suitability (k) Water Bodies (l) Distance Capital City
Note: The graphs illustrate the graphical balancing tests corresponding to Figure 6. The grey buffer around
the lines represent the 95% confidence intervall. The bins on the left-hand side are, with an average distance
of 830 km, relatively far from the capital city and represent a total of 241,241 pixels. In contrast, pixels on the
right-hand side are, with an average of around 430 km, relatively close to the capital city and represent 238,908
pixels.
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Even if (un-)observable geographical factors should by construction be balanced
between the two regimes (‘far’ and ‘close’), this needs to be emprically confirmed.
Figure 7 illustrates the respective graphs for a range of geographical indicators.
All covariates, except for distance from the capital city, move smoothly across the
threshold and do not exhibit significant discontinuities at the cutoff. Based on the
balancing tests, we can thus conclude that the jump in nightlight density stems from
difference in isolation from the capital city.
A remaining concern is that the results might be confounded by country charac-
teristics. For example, supposing that small countries perform better economically,
and given that small countries tend to constitute the ‘close’ group, we would expect
to see comparable patterns even in the absence of effects induced by isolation from
the capital city. Moreover, it might be that the effects are a result of isolation from
a major city rather than isolation from the political center. Yet, if either of the two
concerns were valid, we would observe a similar result when deploying the location
of other major cities. Figure 8 depicts the graphs when conducting the analogous
analysis but for isolation from the placebo city.
Figure 8: Boundary Discontinuity Graphs - Placebo
(a) Placebo City Isolation - Extensive (b) Placebo City Isolation - Intensive
Note: The graphs illustrate the placebo tests regarding the graphical BDD. A placebo city is the largest city if
the capital is not the largest city and the second largest city otherwise. The grey buffer around the lines represent
the 95% confidence intervall. The bins on the left-hand side are, with an average distance of 820 km, relatively far
from the placebo city and represent a total of 238,980 pixels. In contrast, pixels on the right-hand side are, with an
average of around 440 km, relatively close to the placebo city and represent 237,153 pixels.
As it turns out, the placebo graphs clearly indicate that there are no effects associ-
ated with isolation from other cities.13 Yet, despite these highly encouraging results,
at this stage, we cannot be entirely sure that the estimated effects are causal. While
the graphical BDD, balancing and placebo tests give strong support to our hypoth-
esis, in the next step, we need to properly account for the switch between countries
and ethnic homelands at the cutoff.
13The respective balancing graphs, once again, indicate that (un-)observable geographical factors
are balanced and move smoothly across the cutoff (see Figure A4).
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3.3 Boundary Regression Discontinuity
In order to tackle the remaining shortcomings pointed out in Section 3.2, we move
to a more sophisticated BDD regression model based on Equation 6. In this setting,
the switch between countries at the boundary cutoff is accounted for using country
fixed effects. Furthermore, we identify arbitrary borders by exclusively using border
pieces that divide ethnic homelands. Additionally, we nest our boundary segments
within the restricted partitioned ethnic homelands to prevent ethnic shifts within
segments (see Section 2.4).
Table 2: Boundary Discontinuity Estimation
Dependent variable:
Probability Pixel is Lit Log Light Density
in 2016 (VIIRS) in 2016 (VIIRS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Distance from -0.023∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.104∗∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.137∗∗ -0.143∗∗
the Capital City (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.048) (0.048) (0.058) (0.061)
Polynomials for: distance from the border × country × ethnicity (305 groups)
2nd order x x - - x x - -
3rd order - - x - - - x -
4th order - - - x - - - x
Geography Cov. NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country FE 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Segment FE 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569
Observations 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620
R2 0.181 0.183 0.189 0.193 0.161 0.162 0.169 0.173
Adjusted R2 0.175 0.177 0.182 0.185 0.155 0.156 0.161 0.164
Note: This table reports our main BDD regression results corresponding to Equation 6. In order to avoid capturing
the break between the capital city and the hinterlands, we exclude 20 km around each capital city from our sample.
To prevent misassignment of detected nightlights between countries due to blooming, we exclude 3 km on each side
of the boundary. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km), ruggedness (in % slope), %
surface covered with water, mean annual temperature, minimum average temperature during the coldest month,
maximum average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C), crop caloric index, annual precipitation (in mm),
longitude and latitude (projected in km). Boundary segments corresponds to a buffer of 25 km around border pieces
of 50 km line length and are entirely nested within a restricted ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’
(Murdock, 1959). The observations are weighted such that each segment side has the same aggregated weight as its
counterfactual. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2 presents the BDD results for the extensive (columns (1)-(4)) and inten-
sive (columns (5)-(8)) scales of nightlight density. Columns (1) and (5) exclude
all geographical covariates and serve as a reference to assess the extend to which
potentially omitted location-specific characteristics might confound our estimates.
When comparing column (1) to (2) and column (5) to (6), it becomes clear that our
identification strategy proves to be effective. The omission of an extensive set of
geographical covariates impacts the magnitude of our estimates only by a small and
statistically insignificant margin. With the exception of ruggedness, all balancing
tests confirm that in our BDD model, (un-)observable factors are balanced with
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respect to treatment intensity - the coefficients are either insignificant and/or very
close to zero and economically negligible (see Table A7). The models in columns
(2)-(4) as well as (6)-(8) feature an increasing number of polynomials of the running
variable, distance from the border. In order to allow for a sufficient degree of flex-
ibility regarding the dynamics of nightlights around the boundary, we choose third
order polynomials as our default option. Consequently, applying our BDD estima-
tion framework, we can verify that isolation from the capital city has a negative
causal impact on economic development. A one percent increase in distance from
the capital city decreases the probability of a pixel to be lit by 3 percentage points
and the nightlight intensity by 0.14 percent. The causal estimates are therefore of
a slightly higher absolute magnitude than the OLS and boundary area estimates
(see Table 1). This differential is likely triggered by the fact that OLS estimates are
confounded by local economic conditions. One such example are the economically
high performing mining areas in the South-Eastern part far away from the capital
of DR Congo.
3.4 Placebo Tests
In this section, we use our BDD framework to test whether the driving characteris-
tic of isolation from the capital city is rooted in isolation from the political center
or, alternatively, based on isolation from a major city within the country. In order
to answer this question we compare the effects of isolation from the capital city to
isolation from other major cities within the country, the placebo cities, using our
estimation approach specified in Equation 5.
The results in Table 3 indicate very clearly that the effects of isolation from the
capital city differ fundamentally from those of isolation from the placebo city. While,
the impact of isolation from the capital city is significantly negative across all model
specifications14, the effects associated with placebo city isolation are insignificant
and very close to zero. This result holds when decomposing isolation from a city
into a city type and city size effect (see column (6) and (8) where we additionally
control for the interactions of capital and placebo city isolation with their respective
population counts). These results imply that the type of a city (capital vs. other
cities) is much more important than the city size. We conclude that hosting the
political center of the country is the driving force behind the effects of remoteness
from the capital city.
14Due to some collinearity between capital and placebo city isolation, the coefficient of isolation
from the capital city is slightly lower as compared to Table 2.
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Table 3: Placebo Tests
Dependent variable:
Boundary Area Regression Boundary Discontinuity Regression
Probability Pixel is Log Light Density Probability Pixel is Log Light Density
Lit in 2016 (VIIRS) in 2016 (VIIRS) Lit in 2016 (VIIRS) in 2016 (VIIRS)
OLS Ethn FE OLS Ethn FE BDD City Size BDD City Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Distance from -0.022∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.070∗ -0.072∗
the Capital City (0.006) (0.005) (0.027) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.037) (0.037)
Log Distance from -0.008 -0.009 -0.035 -0.038 -0.005 -0.010 -0.041 -0.065
the Placebo City (0.005) (0.007) (0.024) (0.030) (0.018) (0.017) (0.081) (0.073)
CAP × SIZECAP - - - - - 0.001 - 0.004
- - - - - (0.001) - (0.005)
PLC × SIZEPLC - - - - - 0.006 - 0.029
- - - - - (0.010) - (0.047)
Polynomials for: distance from the border × country × ethnicity (299 groups)
3rd order - - - - x x x x
Geography Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 37 37 37 37 35 35 35 35
Ethnicity FE NO 351 NO 351 - - - -
Segment FE - - - - 554 554 554 554
Observations 414,879 414,876 414,879 414,876 164,337 164,337 164,337 164,337
R2 0.083 0.134 0.071 0.123 0.186 0.186 0.164 0.164
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.133 0.071 0.122 0.179 0.179 0.156 0.156
Note: This table reports our boundary area and BDD placebo test based on Equation 5. In order to avoid capturing
the break between the capital or placebo cities and the hinterlands, we exclude 20 km around each capital and
placebo city from our sample. To prevent misassignment of detected nightlights between countries due to blooming,
we exclude 3 km on each side around shared national boundaries. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the
coast (in km), ruggedness (in % slope), % surface covered with water, mean annual temperature, minimum average
temperature during the coldest month, maximum average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C), crop
caloric index, annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km). Columns (1)-(4) constitute
boundary area regressions and columns (2) and (4) additionally include ethnicity fixed effects. Boundary segments
corresponds to a buffer of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length and entirely nested within a restricted
ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). Columns (6) and (8) include interactions
between isolation from the capital and placebo city and their respective population counts. The observations in
columns (5)-(8) are weighted such that each side of a segment has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual.
Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by ethnic homeland in columns (1)-(4) and border segment in columns
(5)-(8) ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4 Sensivity Analysis
4.1 Robustness
In this section, we examine whether the results from Section 3.3 are robust to vari-
ations in the precise model specification. Firstly, we reduce the bandwith of the
segments around the boundary from 25 km to 15 km. Simulataneously, we only
exclude pixels within 1.5 km, instead of 3 km, around the boundary. In addition, we
run the regressions with a varying degree of up to fourth order polynomials of the
running variable. As can be clearly seen in Table A11, the results are very similar
to the previous findings in direction, magnitude and significance.
We then investigate whether the effects of isolation from the capital city are limited
to areas close to the capital city. Therefore, in the next step, we increase the sample
restriction from excluding 20 km (default) around the capital city to 50, 75 and 100
km. Once again, the results in Table A11 reveal that the estimated effects are very
stable with respect to this modification. This finding implies that isolation from the
capital city is a more general phenomenon that is relevant for wide areas within the
country.
In the subsequent step, we test whether the estimated effects of isolation from the
capital city are driven by individual countries or boundaries. To this end, in Figure
A6, we iteratively exclude both sides of boundary segments adjoining a particular
country and compare the estimated coefficient to our unrestricted baseline coeffi-
cients (in Table 2 columns (3) and (7)). The figures clearly illustrate that the es-
timated coefficients are highly robust to excluding particular countries/boundaries.
Even when excluding large amounts of border segments for large or centrally located
countries, all confidence bands overlap clearly with that of the baseline estimate.
While the coefficients prove themselves to be very stable to excluding even large
parts of the sample, it might be that the deviations in the estimated coefficients
are systematic. Therefore, we test whether there are heterogeneities with respect
to the implications of isolation from the capital city depending upon a country’s
level of decentralization, democratization or overall level of development. For this
purpose we categorize all boundaries as either delimiting two relative decentral-
ized15 (democratic16, developed17) or two relatively non-decentralized (autocratic,
15We define countries as decentralized if they exceed the median decentralization value (based on
a decentralization index by Thomas Bijl for J. Vernon Henderson (LSE processed)).
16Democratic countries are defined as having a Polity2 index score of greater than zero (Marshall
et al., 2017).
17Since there is no obvious cutoff for distinguishing between relatively developed and underdevel-
oped countries, we categorize them as such depending on whether they exceed the sample median
or mean GDP level based on estimates by the World Bank (2016).
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underdeveloped) countries or one of each. We then run regressions allowing for
heterogenous coefficients for the different boundary pair cateogries and compare the
coefficients using F-tests (see Table A13).18 The results for decentralization in Table
A13 in columns (1)-(4) are ambiguous and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
effects are the same for relatively decentralized and non-decentralized countries. In
contrast, columns (5)-(8) reveal that the average effect in democracies is higher than
in autocracies where they are consistently very close to zero. The difference is sta-
tistically significant for the 20-year average measure of democracy. Regarding GDP
per capita, irrespective of whether we split the countries by the median or mean
GDP per capita, the results consistently indicate that the effect are significantly
stronger in less developed countries. We conclude that the implications of isolation
from the capital city seem to be more relevant under democratic, as opposed to
autocratic, institutional framework conditions and more relevant in relatively un-
derdeveloped countries. Yet, these results should be interpreted with caution as
the patterns might be confounded by other characteristics these groups of countries
have in common.
Next, we study whether the effects of isolation from the capital city had been relevant
at some point in the past and have persisted until today or, alternatively, whether
the effects are still ongoing and relevant today. For this exercise, we exclude all
pixels that have already been lit in 199219 from the sample and thereby focus on the
pattern of newly emerging nightlights (see Table 4). While the coefficients are, as
expected, slightly lower as in Table 2, they are still strong in magnitude and highly
significant which underlines the present-day importance of the effects.
Further, we want to examine whether a potential shift in the role of the ethnicity
within the country distorts our findings. One factor that we have not accounted for
in our identification strategy is that a partitioned ethnic homeland might represent
a minority group in one but a majority group in another country. This circumstance
makes it necessary to include a measure of ethnic representation within a country
into our model. In columns (3) and (4) in Table 4 we include the log of the number
of pixels belonging to the own ethnic homeland within the country. In contrast, in
columns (5) and (6) we include the share of pixels of an ethnic homeland in the
overall number of pixels within a country. While both measures are closely related,
the former emphasizes the absolute size of an ethnicity while the latter explicitly
targets an ethnic homeland’s share within a country. The results indicate that ethnic
representation does not confound the effects of isolation from the capital city.
18As policy indicators usually have a lot of fluctuations, we conduct the analysis based on the most
recent snapshot of the indicators as well as a 20-year average.
19We use the earliest available DMSP-OLS nightlight grid from 1992 as VIIRS nightlights only
date back to 2012.
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Table 4: Border Discontinuity Estimation - Robustness
Dependent variable: Nightlight Density in 2016 (Prob/Log/PC)
Exclude Pixels Accounting for Minority vs. Population Log Lights
Lit in 1992 Majority Jumps at the Boundary Density Per Capita
Prob Log Prob Log Prob Log Prob Log Log pc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log Distance from -0.022∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.263∗∗
the Capital City (0.008) (0.031) (0.012) (0.058) (0.012) (0.058) (0.011) (0.049) (0.115)
Polynomials for: distance from the border × country × ethnicity (305 groups)
3rd order x x x x x x x x x
Population Density No No No No No No YES YES No
Log Ethnicity Area No No YES YES No No No No No
Ethnicity Share No No No No YES YES No No No
Geography Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Segment FE 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569
Observations 167,841 167,841 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620
R2 0.172 0.149 0.189 0.169 0.189 0.169 0.221 0.258 0.186
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.141 0.182 0.161 0.182 0.161 0.214 0.251 0.179
Note: This table reports robustness tests for our main BDD regression results in Table 2 and extends the model in
Equation 6. In order to avoid capturing the break between the capital city and the hinterlands, we exclude 20 km
around each capital city from our sample. To prevent misassignment of detected nightlights between countries due
to blooming, we exclude 3 km on each side of the national boundary. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance
from the coast (in km), ruggedness (in % slope), % surface covered with water, mean annual temperature, minimum
average temperature during the coldest month, maximum average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C),
crop caloric index, annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km). Boundary segments
corresponds to a buffer of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length and are entirely nested within a
restricted ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). In columns (1)-(2), we exclude
pixels that were already lit in 1992. In columns (3)-(4), we account for the log of the area of the ethnicity wihin
the home country and, in columns (5)-(6), we include the share of the ethnicity with respect to the total area of
the country. In columns (7)-(8), we include population density as a covariate and in column (9), we use the log of
lights per capita as our dependent variable. The observations are weighted such that each side of a segment has the
same aggregated weight as its counterfactual. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by boundary segment.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Since increased economic activity is directly associated to increased population den-
sity, either through higher net fertility or migration, it is difficult to disentangle the
two. Moreover, population density maps do not exhibit a very high accuracy on
the very fine pixel level and are themselves usually based on indicators of economic
activity such as schools, hospitals, roads or even nightlights. Keeping these caveats
in mind, in columns (7) and (8), we control for population density in 2015 to get
an impression of the impact of isolation from the capital city when partialling out
patterns of population density. An alternative and slightly more explicit test cor-
responding to GDP per capita is to use the log of the light density per capita as
dependent variable (column (9)). The results in columns (7)-(9) suggest that the
implications of isolation from the capital city go beyond population agglomeration
and hold robust with respect to per capita estimates.
Finally, we cross-validate our results using the DHS wealth index as an alternative
data source for measuring the spatial distribution of economic performance. For
this purpose, we combine the latest available round for each country in our dataset.
While the DHS comprises a geocoded wealth index for the vast majority of coun-
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Table 5: DHS Wealth Index
Dependent variable:
DHS Wealth Index DHS Wealth Rank
(z-score) (percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Distance from -0.121∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.035∗ -0.033∗
the Capital City (0.045) (0.052) (0.018) (0.019)
Polynomials for: distance from the border
3rd order - x - x
Household Cov. YES YES YES YES
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES
Country FE 28 28 28 28
Segment FE 107 107 107 107
Observations 24,582 24,582 24,582 24,582
R2 0.456 0.458 0.392 0.394
Adjusted R2 0.426 0.381 0.453 0.455
Note: This table reports the BDD regressions results on household wealth using the DHS sample. The z-score of
the wealth index constitutes the dependent variable in columns (1)-(2). The percentile rank within the country
constitutes the dependent variable in columns (3)-(4). The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: age of household head,
age of houshold head squared, number of household members. The ‘Household Cov.’ include: distance from the
coast (in km), mean annual temperature, minimum average temperature during the coldest month, maximum
average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C), annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude
(projected in km) and whether the household is in an urban or rural setting. Boundary segments corresponds
to a buffer of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length and are entirely nested within a restricted ethnic
homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). The observations are weighted such that each
side of a segment has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual. Standard errors in paranthesis are
clustered by DHS cluster and boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
tries and land areas in SSA, eight of the sample countries are not covered (see Fiugre
A1a). Since the granularity of the data structure differs from nightlight grids, we
have to implement some simplifications compared to the estimation framework of
Table 2. Firstly, due to the lower sample size, we restrict the ethnic homelands
by a negative buffer 5 km rather than 15 km. Secondly, the geographical accuarcy
of the DHS is lower than remote sensing sources. DHS households are clustered
with an average of 26 households sharing the same coordinate pair leaving us with a
minimum of one and a median of seven clusters per segment side. Additionally, the
assigned geolocation is randomized by up to 10 km. As a consequence, there is too
little variation and too much noise in the data to model the running variable disag-
gregated for each ethnicity in each country separately. As an alternative, we include
distance from the border in an aggregated form. Thirdly, as the observational unit
are housholds, we include household level control variables: age of head of housh-
old, age of head of household squared and number of de jure houshold members.
Lastly, since there are some concerns about the comparability of the DHS wealth
index with regard to urban vs. rural households, we include a urban/rural dummy
27
Sandro Provenzano The Cost of Remoteness
variable in our model. Yet, whether a location is urban or rural is endogenous as it
is an outcome of economic development. As a consequence, our the magnitude of
our estimated coefficients in Table 5 constitute lower bounds estimates.
The results in Table 5 confirm our finding about the adverse economic consequences
of remoteness from the capital city. A one percent increase in distance from the cap-
ital city results in a drop of household wealth by around 0.12 standard deviations.
This corresponds to a drop of 3.5 percentiles of the national wealth distribution. The
respective balancing tests in columns (1)-(6) in Table A8 underline valid inference.
The respective placebo tests in columns (7)-(8) in Table A8 once again validate that
the effects are specific to isolation from the capital city and do not hold for other
cities.
Based on the wide range of sensivity analyses that we conducted in this section, we
conclude that our results are highly robust to a wide range of alternative specifica-
tions and robustness tests which confirm our estimated negative causal impact of
remoteness from the capital city on economic performance.
5 Mechanisms
So far, we have shown that isolation from the political center within the country,
the capital city, has strong adverse causal net effects on local economic performance.
Since isolation from the capital city itself is not an economic variable, there must
be a more concrete economic link between remoteness from the capital city and
economic performance.
The provision of public goods is a fundamental driver of economic development
(Besley and Ghatak, 2006; Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2019). Campante and Do (2014)
find that US states with isolated capital cities provide less public goods. These re-
sults might reflect aggregations of the microdynamics that are under scrutiny in this
study. In this section, we will provide empirical support for the view that the level
of public goods provision consitutes an important mediator. In a subsequent step,
we then seek to shed light into the causes of the lower public goods provision in
remote areas. In this context, we investigate political representation and account-
ability as potential mechanisms. While the results on political representation are
ambiguous, the results on accountability clearly suggest that dysfunctional feedback
and accountability mechanisms are relevant with regard to the effects.
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5.1 Public Goods
Based on rounds 5, 6 and 7 of the Afrobarometer, we generate an index on the
provision of public goods reflecting whether a cluster is provided with paved roads,
electricity grid access, piped water and a sewage system. The public goods index is
the average of binary responses about the availability of the respective provisions.
Consequently, the index can take the values of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 corresponding
to the respective share of public goods being present. Table 6 combines the results
of OLS, boundary area and BDD regression models, similar to those in Section 3.
We include a range of household and geography controls by default into all models.
This includes a dummy variable corresponding to whether the respondent is located
in an urban or rural area. However, since the degree of urbanization is an outcome
of remoteness and thereby endogenous to the model, the estimated absolute mag-
nitudes constitute lower bound estimates.20 Furthermore, it should be noted that
the Afrobarometer dataset has less observations than the nightlights sample. In
order to avoid the sample size from getting too small, we do not restrict the ethnic
homelands with a negative buffer before defining the boundary segments. Moreover,
since Afrobarometer respondents are clustered in enumeration areas, with in some
cases just one or two clusters per segment side, we do not account for distance from
the boundary disaggregated but rather focus on capturing the general trend.
A one percent increase in isolation from the capital city decreases the probability
index of public goods provision by around 10 percentage points.21 This relationship
also holds, albeit with a slight upward bias, for the OLS and boundary area re-
gressions. Conducting balancing tests (see Table A9) exhibits that the BDD model
is an effective way to reduce imbalances to an economically negligible margin. We
conclude that people in areas isolated from the capital city receive significantly less
public goods and services from their political leaders as compared to those closer
to the capital city. Public goods are therefore likely to be an important mediator
between isolation from the capital city and economic develpment.
However, it is not obvious why the provision of public goods in isolated areas is
reduced. With regard to this puzzle, we empirically investigate two potential expla-
nations. Firstly, geographical isolation potentially translate into political isolation
20In this context, it is important to account for population agglomeration as it is directly related
to public goods provision. Since the urban/rural dummy is highly correlated with population
density, it implicitly accounts for it. Additionally or alternatively including the mean population
density in a 5 or 10 km buffer around the respondent has no significant impact on the estimated
coefficient.
21The corresponding placebo tests and associated F-tests indicate that the effects are indeed specific
to isolation from the capital city and do not hold for placebo cities.
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Table 6: Channel Analysis: Public Goods Provision (Afrobarometer)
Dependent variable: Public Goods Index
OLS Boundary Area BDD
(1) (2) (3)
Log Distance from -0.019∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
the Capital City (0.007) (0.014) (0.036)
Polynomials for: distance from the border
3rd order - - x
Household Cov. YES YES YES
Geography Cov. YES YES YES
Country × Round FE 73 72 71
Segment FE - - 140
Observations 92,247 15,233 8,249
R2 0.482 0.443 0.614
Adjusted R2 0.481 0.440 0.604
Note: This table reports the regressions on the impact of isolation from the capital city on the level of public
goods provision using the Afrobarometer survey. The ‘Household Cov.’ include: age, age squared and sex
of respondent. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km), longitude and latitude
(projected in km) and whether the household is in an urban or rural setting. Column (1) correspond to the
full sample OLS regression, columns (2) to the 25 km boundary area regression and column (3) to the BDD
regression. Boundary segments corresponds to a buffer of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length
and are entirely nested within an ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). In
column (1), the observations are weighted according to the Afrobarometer survey weights. In column (3), the
observations are weighted such that each side of a segment has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual.
Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by Afrobarometer cluster and ethnic homeland (columns (1) and
(2)) and Afrobarometer cluster and boundary segment (column (3)). ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
and thereby exclusion from government resources. For example, isolated areas might
be less represented within the incumbent government and therefore benefit less from
ethnic or regional favoritism (Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Dreher et al., 2019). An-
other explanation is that public goods might be lower due to dysfunctional feedback
and accountability mechanisms. Political agents might simply lack the incentives to
provide those in isolated areas with public goods.
5.2 Public Goods and Political Representation
We start by investigating whether political representation and ‘political favoritism’
are relevant in this context and test whether segment sides farther away from the
capital city exhibit a lower access to power. For this purpose, we examine whether
the national leaders are more likely to come from segment sides closer to the capital
city using an updated version of the database by Dreher et al. (2016: 40-41). Since
measuring an area’s political representation and access to power solely based on the
head of state might not sufficiently reflect the overall power access, we complement
the analysis using the Ethnic Power Relations Core Dataset 2019 (EPR) (Vogt et al.,
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2015) and combine it with spatial information about the location of the respective
politically relevant groups (Wucherpfennig, 2011). The results in Table A10 indicate
that a one percent increase in distance from the capital city decreases the probability
that the incumbent political leader comes from the same region by 9 percentage
points. In contrast, it turns out that a one percent increase in isolation increases
the number of years participated in the ruling government by 3.6 years (within
a period of 18 years since 2000).22 Since the results go in opposite directions, it
remains ambiguous which of the two outweights the other.
5.3 Public Goods and Accountability
Next, we investigate whether accountability might be relevant to the mechanism
between isolation and public goods provision. The idea behind this potential channel
is that, public leaders might have reduced the incentives to invest into isolated areas.
One reason for this might be that the threat of collective action is limited in isolated
areas (Johnson and Thyne, 2018; Campante et al., 2019). Similarly, Pierskalla (2016)
uses this argument in context of the ‘urban-rural bias’. Political leaders might simply
neglect the demands and hazard the consequences of dissatisfied isolated citizens.
We therefore begin the analysis by examining how people in different geographical
locations relate to their political leaders. Given the reduced provision of public
goods, we might expect that isolated groups demonstrate mistrust towards their
government. However, as it turns out, people farther isolated from the capital
exhibit a significantly higher level of trust into their political leadership (see column
(1) in Table 7). The results in Table A14 demonstrate that the increased trust
in politicians is associated with the ruling party but not with the opposition party
suggesting that the reason for the higher trust does not stem from a generally higher
level of trust or credulity in isolated areas. Rather, it seems that the increased
trust in state leaders is a result of a lower perceived corruption as well as a higher
performance evaluation of national leaders (see columns (1) and (2) in Table 7).
The augmented approval rate of national leaders in isolated areas is in contrast to
the idea that the national governments simply neglect the demands from people in
isolated areas. The higher voter turnout in remote areas also contradicts the view
that isolated citizens feel left out and politically disenchanted (see Table A14).
These patterns rather support the view that isolated citizens are not aware of their
disadvantaged position and therefore do not demand a higher provision of public
services. Yet, this does not seem to be a matter of education or asymetric identity
22A simple explanation for this phenomenon might be that incumbent governments tend to include
isolated groups into the government to counteract secessive aspirations. Another possible reason
could be that isolated groups are striving to have an impact politically and overcompensate for
their geographical isolation.
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Table 7: Channel Analysis: Perception of Political Leadership and Accountability
BDD Model with dependent variable z-score of:
Trust in Government Government Education Frequency Advocate
Political Corruption Performance Level of News Checks and
Leaders Perception Evaluation Consumption and Balances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Distance from 0.191∗∗∗ -0.078∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.064 -0.139∗∗ -0.094∗∗
the Capital City (0.061) (0.043) (0.064) (0.056) (0.066) (0.041)
Polynomials for: distance from the border
3rd order x x x x x x
Household Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country × Round FE 70 71 71 71 71 71
Segment FE 140 140 140 140 140 140
Observations 7,812 6,705 6,593 8,310 8,113 7,763
R2 0.202 0.191 0.229 0.312 0.192 0.160
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.164 0.202 0.293 0.169 0.135
Note: This table reports the regressions on the impact of isolation from the capital city on the perception of
political leaders and accountability. The ‘Household Cov.’ include: age, age squared and sex of respondent. The
‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km), longitude and latitude (projected in km) and whether
the household is in an urban or rural setting. Columns (1)-(3) correspond to trust, corruption perception and
performance evaluation of their national political leadership. Column (4) corresponds to the educational level,
column (5) to the frequency of news consumption and column (6) to the extent to which respondents are advocating
a system of checks and balances to monitor the actions of their political leaders. All models are BDD regressions
using ‘Segment FE’ for boundary segments of 50 km length with a buffer of 25 km that are nested within an ethnic
homelands based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). All observations are weighted such that each side
of a segment has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by
Afrobarometer cluster and boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
because these characteristics are balanced between areas close and far from the
capital (see Tables 7 and A14). In contrast, we find significant imbalances with
regard to the frequency of news consumption which is considerably smaller in isolated
areas (see Table 7). Hence, isolated citizens might trust their national leaders more
because they know less about them. This factor has important repercussions on the
functioning of effective accountability mechanisms that keep the actions of political
agents aligned with the interest of the people. Since isolated citizens know less
about the actions of their political agents and their reduced provision with public
goods, national leaders are left with lower incentives to providing them with services.
The hypothesis of dysfunctional accountability mechanisms in isolated areas is also
consistent with the observation that isolated citizens are less inclined to advocate for
checks and balances on the government. The corresponding placebo tests indicate
that these patterns are specific to isolation from the capital city and do not hold for
other major cities (see Table A15).
To conclude, our analysis suggests that public goods provision is a important medi-
ator between remoteness from the capital city and economic performance. Further-
more, our results support the view that dysfunctional accountability mechanisms
are important regarding the reduced level of public goods provision.
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6 Alternative Explanations
In this section, we investigate two alternative potential channels that might con-
stitute important mediators between distance from the capital city and economic
development: Market access and conflict. We show that neither market access nor
conflict is likely to be relevant with regard to the observed patterns.
6.1 Market Access and Trade
As an alternative potential channel, distance to the capital city might affect eco-
nomic growth through reduced market access (Redding and Sturm, 2008; Bosker and
Garretsen, 2012; Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016; Gibbons and Wu, 2017). Places
that are farther away from the capital city might face higher costs when buying
and selling intermediate and final goods and services. This, in turn, might have
major repercussions on the opportunities for economies of scale and productivity
growth. Since capital cities constitute important markets within the country, these
effects might be significant. Yet, if a reduced market access was indeed an important
channel, we should observe similar effects for remoteness from other major markets
within the country. The fact that, even when accounting for city and hence market
size, the coefficients associated with placebo cities are insignificant (see Table 3)
raises doubt on the relevance of market access in this context. A potential explana-
tion could be that the capital or placebo cities only represent one of multiple market
agglomerations within the country which decreases their individual impact.
Another way of testing for this channel makes use of the fact that the shared na-
tional boundaries in our sample feature different degrees of border permeability with
regard to trade. If borders did not constitute barriers for trade, in our BDD design,
counterfactual pixels on both sides of the boundary would by construction have the
same market access. Therefore, if market access was indeed a relevant channel, we
should observe that the effects of remoteness from the capital city are strongest at
restrictive borders and lower at relatively open national boundaries. In Table 8,
we therefore test whether the impact of isolation from the capital city is lower at
boundaries within trade blocs such as within free trade agreements (FTA), customs
and monetary unions. For this purpose, we include interactions between Log Dis-
tance from the Capital City and dummies identifying low barrier boundaries into
our main BDD model (see Equation 6). In columns (1) and (2) in Table 8, we use
boundaries within FTAs. The results suggest that the effects are stronger within
FTAs than at more restrictive boundaries which is in contrast to the idea that mar-
ket access is driving the results. In columns (3) and (4), we tighten the criterion for
relatively open borders and only consider customs unions and in columns (5) and
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Table 8: Channel Analysis: Market Access and Trade
Dependent variable: VIIRS Nightlights in 2016 (Prob/Log)
Prob Log Prob Log Prob Log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Distance from -0.013 -0.067 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.158∗∗
the Capital City (0.011) (0.044) (0.014) (0.068) (0.014) (0.066)
CAP × FTA -0.028∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ - - - -
(0.011) (0.044)
CAP × Customs Union - - 0.023 0.098 - -
(0.015) (0.061)
CAP × Customs Union and - - - - 0.018 0.083
CAP × Monetary Union (0.015) (0.060)
Polynomials: dist. to border × country × ethnicity (305 groups)
3rd order x x x x x x
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 36 36 36 36 36 36
Segment FE 569 569 569 569 569 569
Observations 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620
R2 0.189 0.169 0.189 0.169 0.189 0.169
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.161 0.182 0.161 0.182 0.161
Note: Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by border segment.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: This table reports the tests for heterogeneities at boundaries that are less restrictive to trade and extend
the model in Equation 6. In order to avoid capturing the break between the capital city and the hinterlands, we
exclude 20 km around each capital city from our sample. To prevent misassignment of detected nightlights between
countries due to blooming, we exclude 3 km on each side of the border. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance
from the coast (in km), ruggedness (in % slope), % surface covered with water, mean annual temperature, minimum
average temperature during the coldest month, maximum average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C),
crop caloric index, annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km). Boundary segments
corresponds to a buffer of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length and are entirely nested within a
restricted ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). We include interactions of CAP
(Log Distance to the Capital City) and a dummy for boundaries between countries with FTAs (columns (1)-(2)),
customs unions (columns (3)-(4)) and those that additionally share a common currency (columns (5)-(6)). The
observations are weighted such that each side of a segment has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual.
Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(6) only those that also share a common currency. In both cases, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the effects at relatively open boundaries are any different than
at restrictive ones. Consequently, based on the results in this section, we conclude
that it is very unlikely that market access and trade constitute the missing economic
link between remoteness from the capital city and economic performance.
6.2 Conflict
There is vast empirical evidence that conflict has negative implications for economic
developement (see for example Ray and Esteban (2017) for a general overview and
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Serneels and Verpoorten (2015) or Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) for evidence
from the African continent). Further, there are multiple ways in which isolation
from the capital city might affect conflict, hence ultimately economic performance.
Since a conflict or protest farther away from the capital represents a lower threat to
a government (Johnson and Thyne, 2018), the state might be less inclined to prevent
or resolve such isolated conflicts. Also, the capacity of a state to counter conflicts
in isolated areas might simply be restricted. This circumstance might even attract
conflict parties to target remote areas. Moreover, a potentially lower state presence
might impact the propensity for ethnic cleavages and conflict. Lastly, conflict might
be a result of inequalities between areas close and far from the capital city and
thereby reinforce the adverse implications of isolation from the capital city.
Table 9: Channel Analysis: Conflict
Dependent variable: Conflict frequency (ACLED)
Viol Demo Non-V All Viol Demo Non-V All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Distance from 0.356 0.061 0.130 0.547 0.413 0.186 0.151 0.751
the Capital City (0.720) (0.632) (0.146) (1.344) (0.732) (0.573) (0.149) (1.318)
Population Count - - - - 0.026 0.056∗∗ 0.010∗ 0.092∗
in Segment Side (0.021) (0.026) (0.006) (0.050)
Country FE 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Segment FE 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568
Observations 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138
R2 0.726 0.558 0.620 0.684 0.730 0.648 0.648 0.709
Adjusted R2 0.415 0.055 0.188 0.325 0.423 0.247 0.246 0.377
Note: This table reports the balancing tests on conflict with regard to isolation from the capital city. The observa-
tional unit in these models are the BBD boundary segments. The dependent variables are instances of conflict by
type in the respective side of the boundary segment in the period between 01.01.2000 and 27.11.2019. Column (1)
refers to ‘violent conflicts’, column (2) to ‘demonstrations’, column (3) to the number of ‘non-violent actions’ and
column (4) aggregates all three kinds of conflict (for more information on these categories please refer to the ACLED
homepage at: https://www.acleddata.com/resources/general-guides/). Boundary segments corresponds to a buffer
of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length and are entirely nested within a restricted ethnic homeland
based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by boundary
segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
In order to assess whether conflict is actually relevant in this context, we test whether
there is any pattern of increased or perhaps even decreased conflict in isolated ar-
eas. To this end, we use our ACLED dataset of conflicts by type (Violent Events,
Demonstration Events and Non-Violent Action) (Raleigh et al., 2010). Out of the to-
tal 88,853 conflict events in our sample countries between 01.01.2000 and 27.11.2019,
a total of 3,446 fall into the area of our boundary segments. We aggregate the fre-
quency of conflict that fall within each segment side and run BDD regressions with
segment sides as the observational unit (see Table 9). Since conflict frequency might
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directly increase with population density, in columns (5)-(8), we additionally account
for the total population count in each segment side. Our results demonstrate that
there is no significant relationship between the frequency any conflict type (or all
types of conflicts aggregated) and distance from the capital city. As a consequence,
we have no reason to believe that conflict is relevant with regard to the implications
of isolation from the capital city.
7 Conclusion
Using extensive remote sensing data on the very fine pixel level and large collec-
tions of geocoded surveys from the DHS and the Afrobarometer, we investigate the
impact of isolation from the capital city on economic development in Sub-Saharan
Africa. We obtain quasi-random variation in treatment at arbitrarily set national
borders that divide ethnic homelands with similar geographical, social and histor-
ical factors. Conducting our analysis in a BDD regression framework, we deliver
tangible evidence that isolation from the capital city imposes strong adverse causal
net effects on the level of local economic capacity. We perform a series of alternative
specifications, balancing and robustness tests that underline that our estimates are
in fact causal. Moreover, comparing the effects of isolation from the capital city
to isolation from other major cities confirms that hosting the political center is the
driving force behind the effects.
In addition, we investigate potential channels through which isolation from the cap-
ital city might affect economic performance: public goods provision, market access
and conflict. We show that the latter two, market access and conflict, are unlikely to
be the link between isolation and economic development. In contrast, we document
that remoteness from the capital city, as opposed to other major cities, is linked
to a significant drop in the level of public goods provision. This finding suggest
that the provision of public goods and services constitutes a key mediator between
isolation and prosperity. In order to understand the imbalances in public goods, we
explore two potential explanations. Firstly, we hypothesize that geographical isola-
tion might translate into political isolation and thereby exclusion from government
resources and, secondly, that politicians are not being held accountable by isolated
citizens and therefore have reduced incentives to provide them with public goods.
Our findings regarding political representation are ambiguous - the head of state is
more likely to come from regions closer to the capital city but remote regions are
more often part of the coalition in power. In contrast, our findings provide clear
support for the accountability channel. Our analyses indicate that isolated popula-
tions, despite receiving less public goods, have more trust into their political leaders,
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evaluate their performance better, believe less that they are corrupt or that their
actions should be monitored. At the same time, people in isolated areas follow the
news less frequently. We interpret this as reflecting an asymmetry in information
about political affairs between areas far and close from the capital. We conclude
that these findings point at dysfunctional accountability mechanism that are at the
root of the decreased levels of public goods and ultimately hamper economic growth.
Our findings are novel in the literature and provide new insights into the political
economy of the location of the capital city (Campante and Do, 2014; Campante et al.,
2019). Furthermore, we add to the literature regarding the limited institutional out-
reach of the state beyond the capital city (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013)
and the literature on power sharing and political representation in SSA (Francois
et al., 2015). Last but not least, by identifying proximity to the capital as an impor-
tant dimension of spatial inequality, we contribute to the debate about the causes
of the very high levels of economic inequality in the Sub-Saharan African context.
The results of this study underline the importance for targeted investments into pub-
lic goods that are currently undersupplied in areas distant from the capital city. An
alternative policy approach would be to strengthen the accountability mechanisms
that foster a more equal distribution of public goods indirectly. Our analyses suggest
that increasing the connectivity between the capital and the hinterland - with re-
gard to physical transportation as well as media and communication - could increase
accountability. Future research needs to analyze to what extend infrastructure up-
grading, that reduces the meaning of distance, alleviates the adverse implications
of remoteness from the capital city - and perhaps makes them ultimately disappear
altogether.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Sources and Description
In the following, we present the various datasets that we collected from different
sources and merged into the final dataset for the remote sensing analysis including
an URL for download:
Remote Sensing Grids
Regarding nighttime luminosity data, there are currently two products: the ‘new’
VIIRS (Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite) by the Suomi National Polar
Partnership between NOAA and NASA and the ‘old’ Version 4 DMSP-OLS (De-
fense Meteorological Satellite Program - Operational Linescan System) by the U.S.
Air Force and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
The VIIRS images are more recent and are superior to the DMSP-OLS with re-
gard to their accuracy and resolution (Elvidge et al., 2013). We use the latest
cleaned annual VIIRS product from 2016 that underwent extensive filtering includ-
ing outlier (such as fires or ephemeral lights) and background (non-lights) removal
as our main proxy for economic activity (see Elvidge et al. (2017) for details on
the alogrithms used to pre-process and filter the annual VIIRS images). This
dataset is publicly available and can be downloaded from: https://www.ngdc.n
oaa.gov/eog/viirs/download dnb composites.html. The drawback of the VIIRS is
that the earliest available grids (unfiltered and monthly) are available for April
2012 while the DMSP-OLS span from 1992-2013. Therefore, in order to obtain an
‘early’ disaggregated proxy for economic activity, we will supplement our dataset
with the annaul DMSP-OLS nighttime lights from 1992 (available for download at:
https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html#AVSLCFC).
The water surface grid (5 × 5 arcseconds) is aggregated to reflect the percentage of
the surface that is covered with water and was obtained from the European Space
Agency (ESA). It is publicly available for download at: http://maps.elie.ucl.ac.be/
CCI/viewer/index.php.
The land elevation (in m) grid (30 × 30 arcseconds) by the NASA in context of
the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) based on the work of Jarvis et al.
(2008) is available for download at: http://www.cgiar-csi.org/data/srtm-90m-digit
al-elevation-database-v4-1.
A measure for terrain ruggedness measured in degree of slope with an initial reso-
I
Sandro Provenzano The Cost of Remoteness
lution of (20 × 20 arcseconds) based on Nunn and Puga (2012) was obtained from:
https://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/.
The ‘Crop Caloric Index’, a measure of agricultural suitability containing the po-
tential agricultural caloric output per year and hectar (excluding zero yields) based
on Galor and O¨zak (2016) was obtained from https://ozak.github.io/Caloric-Suita
bility-Index/.
Annual precipitation (in mm), annual mean temperature, minimum temperature in
the coldest month and maximum temperature in the warmest month (all in ◦C) based
on Karger et al. (2017) were obtained from http://chelsa-climate.org/downloads/.
The population grid (30 × 30 arcseconds) for 2015 was obtained from Worldpop
(available for download at: http://www.worldpop.org.uk/data/summary/?doi=10.
5258/SOTON/WP00004) and contains the (UN-adjusted) total number of inhabi-
tants per pixel.
Vectorized Data
The list of cities including their population size were obtained from various sources
including United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population
Division (2018) (https://population.un.org/wup/Download/), CityPopulation (see
here for further information: https://www.citypopulation.de/) and WorldPopula-
tionReview (see here for further information: http://worldpopulationreview.com/).
In a next step, these cities were geocoded in R using an OpenStreetMap (https:
//www.openstreetmap.org/) interface.
The country shapefiles were obtained from GADM (currently Version 3.6) and are
available for download at: https://gadm.org/data.html.
Based on the above sources we have calculated the following indicators on the pixel
level using the projected coordinate reference system ‘Africa Sinusoidal’ which prop-
erly maps distances in Sub-Saharan Africa using the metric system (in km): distance
from the capital city, distance from the placebo city, distance from the coast, dis-
tance from shared national boundaries, latitude and logitude.
The ethnographic ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ based on Murdock (1959) was recently
digitized by Nathan Nunn and is available for download at: https://worldmap.har
vard.edu/data/geonode:murdock ea 2010 3.
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Afrobarometer Data:
In the following, we provide details about the construction of the indicators that are
based on the Afrobarometer survey data from round 5, 6 and 7 including extracts
from the underlying questions in the Afrobarometer codebook (Isbell, 2017). Note
that respondents who answered ‘Do not know’, ‘Refused to answer’ or ‘Missing’ are
excluded from the sample for the respective indicator.
Public Goods Index
Average of responses to each of the following questions (responed by the intervie-
wee prior to approaching the individual households within the cluster/ enumeration
area):
Piped Water System: Are the following services present in the primary sampling
unit/ enumeration area: Piped water system that most houses could access? Value
Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes.
Electricity Grid: Are the following services present in the primary sampling unit/
enumeration area: Electricity grid that most houses could access? Value Labels:
0=No, 1=Yes.
Paved Road: Thinking of your journey here: Was the road at the start point in the
primary sampling unit/ enumeration area paved/ tarred/ concrete? Value Labels:
0=No, 1=Yes.
Sewage System: Are the following services present in the primary sampling unit/
enumeration area: Sewage system that most houses could access? Values Labels:
0=No, 1=Yes.
Trust into the Political Elite
Average of responses to each of the following questions (see parenthesis): How much
do you trust each of the following, or have you not heard enough about them to say:
The President (Parliament)? Value Labels: 0 = Not at all, 1 = Just a little, 2 =
Somewhat, 3 = A lot.
Corruption Perception of Political Leadership
Average of responses to each of the following questions (see parenthesis): How many
of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard
enough about them to say: The President and Officials in his Office (Members of
Partliament, Government Officials)? Value Labels: 0 = Not at all, 1 = Just a little,
2 = Somewhat, 3 = A lot.
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Evaluation of Government Performance
Average of responses to each of the following questions (see parenthesis):
Now let’s speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly
would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t
you heard enough to say: Managing the economy (handling improving living stan-
dards of the poor, handling creating jobs, handling keeping prices down, handling
narrowing income gaps, handling reducing crime, handling improving basic health
services, handling addressing educational needs, handling providing water and sani-
tation services, handling ensuring enough to eat, handling fighting corruption, han-
dling and maintaining roads and bridges, handling providing reliable electric sup-
ply)? Value Labels: 1 = Very badly, 2 = Fairly badly, 3 = Fairly well, 4 = Very well.
Voter Turnout
Understanding that some people were unable to vote in the most recent national
election in [20xx], which of the following statements is true for you? Value Labels:
0 = You were not registered to vote Or you decided not to vote Or you could not
find the polling station Or you were prevented from voting Or you did not have time
to vote Or you did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters’
register Or Did not vote for some other reason, 1 = You voted in the elections
National vs. Ethnic Identity
Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [ENTER NATIONALITY]
and being a [Respondent’s Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses
your feelings? Value Labels: 1 = I feel only (Respondent’s ethnic group), 2 = I
feel more (Respondent’s ethnic group) than [ENTER NATIONALITY], 3 = I feel
equally [ENTER NATIONALITY] and (Respondent’s ethnic group), 4 = I feel more
[ENTER NATIONALITY] than (Respondent’s ethnic group), 5 = I feel only [EN-
TER NATIONALITY].
Educational Level
What is your highest level of education? Value Labels: 0 = No formal schooling, 1 =
Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2 = Some primary schooling,
3 = Primary school completed, 4 = Intermediate school or Some secondary school
/ high school, 5 = Secondary school / high school completed, 6 = Post-secondary
qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or
college, 7 = Some university, 8 = University completed, 9 = Post-graduate.
IV
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Advocate Check and Balances
Average of support for statement 2 in the two respective questions:
Checks by citizens:
Statement 1: It is more important to have a government that can get things done,
even if we have no influence over what it does.
Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government ac-
countable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.
Checks by parliament:
Statement 1: The President should be able to devote his full attention to developing
the country rather than wasting time justifying his actions.
Statement 2: Parliament should ensure that the President explains to it on a regular
basis how his government spends taxpayers’ money.
Value Labels: 1 = Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2 = Agree with Statement
1, 3 = Agree with Statement 2, 4 = Agree very strongly with Statement 2, 5 =
Agree with neither.
News Consumption
How often do you get news from any of the following sources: Radio, Television,
Newspaper or Internet? 0 = Never, 1 = Less than once a month, 2 = A few times
a month, 3 = A few times a week, 4 = Every day.
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Formal Identification
1. Let s be a segment consisting of pixels closely around both sides of a bound-
ary d between country c and country k. We denominate pixels belonging to
country c by i while pixels belonging to country k are denominated by j. We
assume that, within a segment, pixels i and j are equally represented, have
homogenous geographical characteristics, E(Xi) = E(Xj) = E(Xs), and be-
long to the same ethnicity e.
From Equation 3 we get:
Ys = βCAPs + γXs + bc,k + be + εs (6)
Yi + Yj
2 = β
CAPi + CAPj
2 + γ
Xi + Xj
2 +
bc + bk
2 +
be + be
2 +
εi + εj
2 (7)
Yi + Yj = β(CAPi + CAPj) + γ(Xi + Xj) + bc + bk + 2be + εi + εj (8)
2. Applying segment fixed effects to Equation 3: E[Yi − Ys] = E[2Yi − 2Ys] =
E[2Equation 3 − Equation 8]:
E
[
2Yi − Yi − Yj
]
= E
[
β(2CAPi − CAPi − CAPj) + γ(2Xi − Xi − Xj)
+ (2bc − bc − bk) + (2be − 2be) + (2εi − εi − εj)
]
(9)
E
[
Yi − Yj
]
= E
[
β(CAPi − CAPj) + γ(Xi − Xj)
+ (bc − bk) + (εi − εj)
]
(10)
E
[
ΔYi,j
]
= E
[
βΔCAPi,j + γΔXi,j + bb + Δεi,j
]
(11)
3. Under the assumption that (un-)observable factors are balanced across the
boundary, the (un-)observable covariates cancel each other out:
E(ΔXi,j) = E(Xi − Xj) = 0 (12)
,thus:
E
[
ΔYi,j
]
= E
[
βΔCAPi,j + bb + Δεi,j
]
(13)
XI
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4. Furthermore, the larger a segment, the variation of isolation from the capital
city or location-specific characteristics within a segment side, the higher the
endogeneity bias. Therefore, segments sides need to be sufficiently small and
homogenous to eliminate the correlation between isolation from the capital
city and geographical covariates.
lim
s→i∪j
Cov
[
ΔCAPi,j ,Δεi,j
]
(14)
= lim
s→i∪j
Cov
[
(CAPi − CAPj) , (X˜i − X˜j)
]
= 0 (15)
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Figure A2: Unrestricted Segments
(a) Simple Border Segments
(b) Simple Border Segments - Magnified
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Figure A3: Restricted Segments
(a) Border Segments nested within Restricted Parioned Ethnic Homelands
(b) Border Segments nested within Restricted Parioned Ethnic Homelands - Magnified
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A.2 Balancing Tests
Table A6: OLS - Balancing Tests
Dependent variable: Normalization of
Distance from the Coast Crop Caloric Index
All Pixels Border Area All Pixels Border Area
OLS Ethnicity FE OLS Ethnicity FE OLS Ethnicity FE OLS Ethnicity FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Distance from 0.178∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.042∗ -0.046∗ 0.008
the Capital City (0.022) (0.016) (0.029) (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014)
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Ethnicity FE - 706 - 351 - 706 - 351
Observations 3,518,146 3,518,146 416,667 416,664 3,518,146 3,518,146 416,667 416,664
R2 0.838 0.974 0.792 0.980 0.785 0.935 0.670 0.930
Adjusted R2 0.838 0.974 0.792 0.980 0.785 0.935 0.670 0.930
Note: This table reports the balancedness tests for the examples of distance from the coast (in km) and crop caloric
index corresponding to the OLS and boundary area regressions in Table 1 based on Equation 3. We normalize
the dependent variables by dividing them by their sample mean. In order to avoid capturing the break between
the capital city and the hinterlands, we exclude 20 km around each capital city from our sample. To prevent
misassignment of detected nightlights between countries due to blooming, we exclude 3 km on each side of the
border. The boundary area regressions (‘Border’) are restricted to all pixels with centroids within the range of 25
km from shared national borders. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km), ruggedness (in
% slope), % surface covered with water, mean annual temperature, minimum average temperature during the coldest
month, maximum average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C), crop caloric index, annual precipitation
(in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km) - except for when the respective variable is the dependent variable
itself. The ‘Ethnicity FE’ are based on the ethnic homelands in the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). Standard
errors in paranthesis are clustered by ethnic homeland. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A7: Border Discontinuity Estimation - Balancing Tests
Dependent variable: Normalization of
Dist. Coast Elevation Water Rugged. ∅ Temp. Crop Precip. Lon. Lat.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log Distance from 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.002 -0.367∗∗ 0.000 -0.005 0.010 0.006∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗
the Capital City (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.156) (0.000) (0.006) (0.017) (0.001) (0.009)
Polynomials for: distance from the border × country × ethnicity (305 groups)
3rd order x x x x x x x x x
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Segment FE 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569
Observations 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620
R2 1.000 0.999 0.317 0.683 1.000 0.990 0.972 1.000 1.000
Adjusted R2 1.000 0.999 0.311 0.680 1.000 0.990 0.971 1.000 1.000
Note: This table reports the balancedness tests corresponding to our main BDD regressions in Table 2 based on
Equation 6. We normalize the dependent variables by dividing them by their sample mean. In order to avoid
capturing the break between the capital city and the hinterlands, we exclude 20 km around each capital city from
our sample. To prevent misassignment of detected nightlights between countries due to blooming, we exclude 3
km on each side of the national boundary. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km),
ruggedness (in % slope), % surface covered with water, mean annual temperature, minimum average temperature
during the coldest month, maximum average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C), crop caloric index,
annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km) - except for when the respective variable is
the dependent variable itself. Boundary segments corresponds to a buffer of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line
length and entirely nested within a restricted ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959).
The observations are weighted such that each segment side has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual.
Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A8: DHS - Balancing and Placebo Tests
Dependent variable:
Balancing Tests: Normalization of Placebo Tests
Distance Longitude Latitude Elevation Mean Precip- DHS wealth index
to Coast Temperature itation (z-score)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Distance from 0.000 0.000 0.029 -0.035 -0.000∗∗ -0.008 -0.094∗ -0.086
the Capital City (0.004) (0.001) (0.092) (0.029) (0.000) (0.010) (0.054) (0.061)
Log Distance from - - - - - - 0.071 0.082
the Placebo City (0.064) (0.065)
Placebo Tests CoefCAP=CoefPLC
F-Statistic - - - - - - 8.76∗∗∗ 8.40∗∗∗
Polynomials for: distance from the border
3rd order x x x x x x - x
Household Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Segment FE 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569
Observations 24,582 24,582 24,582 24,582 24,582 24,582 23,671 23,671
R2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.974 1.000 0.985 0.467 0.469
Adjusted R2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.974 1.000 0.985 0.464 0.465
Note: This table reports the DHS balancing (columns (1)-(6)) and placebo tests (columns (7)-(8)) corresponding to
Table 5. In columns (1)-(6), we normalize the dependent variables by dividing them by their sample mean. Regarding
the placebo tests, we report the respective F-tests on the equality of the coefficients. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include:
age of household head, age of houshold head squared, number of household members. The ‘Household Cov.’ include:
mean annual temperature, minimum average temperature during the coldest month, maximum average temperature
during the warmest month (in ◦C), annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km) and
whether the household is in an urban or rural setting - except for when the respective variable is the dependent
variable itself. Boundary segments corresponds to a buffer of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length and
are entirely nested within a restricted ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). The
observations are weighted such that each side of a segment has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual.
Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by DHS cluster and boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A9: Channel Analysis: Afrobarometer Balancing Tests
Dependent variable: Normalization of
Distance from the Coast Longitude Latitude
OLS Boundary BDD OLS Boundary BDD OLS Boundary BDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log Distance from 0.154∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.185 -0.228 0.057∗∗∗
the Capital City (0.023) (0.050) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.001) (0.128) (0.229) (0.020)
Polynomials for: distance from the border
3rd order - - x - - x - - x
Household Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country × Round FE 73 72 71 73 72 71 73 72 71
Segment FE - - 140 - - 140 - - 140
Observations 93,242 15,419 8,347 93,242 15,419 8,347 93,242 15,419 8,347
R2 0.856 0.891 0.999 0.991 0.994 1.000 0.988 0.989 1.000
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.891 0.999 0.991 0.994 1.000 0.988 0.989 1.000
Note: This table reports the Afrobarometer balancing tests for distance from the coast (in km), latitude and
longitude (in km) corresponding to Table 6, 7 and A14. We normalize the dependent variables by dividing them by
their sample mean. The ‘Household Cov.’ include: age, age squared and sex of respondent. The ‘Geographical Cov.’
include: distance from the coast (in km), longitude and latitude (projected in km) and whether the household is in
an urban or rural setting - except for when the respective variable is the dependent variable itself. The segments
are entirely nested within an ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). In the full
sample OLS regressions, the observations are weighted according to the Afrobarometer survey weights. In the BDD
regressions, the observations are weighted such that each side of a segment has the same aggregated weight as
its counterfactual. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by Afrobarometer cluster and ethnic homeland in
the OLS and boundary area regressions and Afrobarometer cluster and boundary segment in the BDD regressions.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A10: Channel Analysis: Political Representation Balancing Tests
Dependent variable: Political Representation
Region of Birth of Leader (1/0) EPR Power Coalition Status (in years since 2000)
All Since 2000 Ongoing Irrelevant Powerless Junior Senior In Power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Distance from -0.026 -0.152∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -2.569∗∗∗ -1.096∗∗ 2.278∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗ 3.664∗∗∗
the Capital City (0.039) (0.032) (0.027) (0.838) (0.530) (0.785) (0.667) (0.909)
Population Share 1.232∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ - - - - -
of Region (0.308) (0.247) (0.224)
Country FE 35 35 35 33 33 33 33 33
Segment FE 568 568 568 531 531 531 531 531
Observations 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064
R2 0.738 0.695 0.649 0.751 0.862 0.739 0.819 0.796
Adjusted R2 0.438 0.347 0.248 0.468 0.704 0.442 0.612 0.564
Note: This table reports the balancing tests on political representation with regard to isolation from the capital city.
The observational unit in these models are the BBD boundary segments. The dependent variables in column (1)-(3)
are dummies indicating whether a head of state came from the same admin-1 region as the boundary segment side
(since independence, since 2000 and only refering to incumbent state leaders). The dependent variables in columns
(4)-(8) correspond the total number of years a segment side has spent under the respective power access status in
the period between 2000 and 2018 (for more information on these categories please refer to Section 2.3). Boundary
segments corresponds to a buffer of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length and are entirely nested within
a restricted ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). Standard errors in paranthesis
are clustered by boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure A4: Discontinuity Balancing Graphs: Placebo City
(a) Distance from Coast (b) Mean Temperature (c) Min Temperature
(d) Max Temperature (e) Ruggedness (f) Elevation
(g) Latitude (h) Longitude (i) Precipitation
(j) Crop Suitability (k) Water Bodies (l) Distance Capital City
Note: The graphs illustrate the graphical placebo balancing tests corresponding to Figure 8. The grey buffer
around the lines represent the 95% confidence intervall. The bins on the left-hand side are, with an average
distance of 820 km, relatively far from the capital city and represent a total of 238,980 pixels. In contrast,
pixels on the right-hand side are, with an average of around 440 km, relatively close to the capital city and
represent 237,153 pixels.
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Table A11: Border Discontinuity Estimation - Robustness Bandwidth
Dependent variable:
Probability Pixel is Lit Log Light Density
in 2016 (VIIRS) in 2016 (VIIRS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Distance from -0.009 -0.019∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.051∗ -0.078∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗
the Capital City (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.029) (0.036) (0.045) (0.054) (0.059)
Polynomials for: distance from the border × country × ethnicity (325 groups)
1nd order - x - - - - x - - -
2nd order - - x - - - - x - -
3rd order - - - x - - - - x -
4th order - - - - x - - - - x
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Segment FE 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608
Observations 106,746 106,746 106,746 106,746 106,746 106,746 106,746 106,746 106,746 106,746
R2 0.176 0.206 0.217 0.224 0.229 0.166 0.194 0.204 0.212 0.217
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.198 0.207 0.212 0.215 0.161 0.187 0.194 0.200 0.203
Note: This table reports robustness tests on our main BDD regression results in Table 2 based on Equation 6
and feature variations on the boundary thickness, boundary buffer and the number of polynomials of the running
variable. In order to avoid capturing the break between the capital city and the hinterlands, we exclude 20 km
around each capital city from our sample. To prevent misassignment of detected nightlights between countries due
to blooming, we exclude 1.5 km (instead of 3 km) on each side of the national boundary. The ‘Geographical Cov.’
include: distance from the coast (in km), ruggedness (in % slope), % surface covered with water, mean annual
temperature, minimum average temperature during the coldest month, maximum average temperature during the
warmest month (in ◦C), crop caloric index, annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km).
Boundary segments corresponds to a buffer of 15 km (instead of 25 km) around border pieces of 50 km line length
and are entirely nested within a restricted ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959).
The observations are weighted such that each side of a segment has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual.
Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A12: Border Distcontinuity Estimation: Robustness - Capital City Buffer
Dependent variable: VIIRS Nightlights 2016
Exclude all Pixels with a Distance from the Capital City
< 50 km < 75 km < 100 km
Prob Log Prob Log Prob Log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Distance from -0.030∗∗ -0.135∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.151∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.164∗∗
the Capital City (0.012) (0.060) (0.014) (0.067) (0.016) (0.077)
Polynomials for: distance from the border × country × ethnicity
305 groups 295 groups 290 groups
3rd order x x x x x x
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 36 36 36 36 36 36
Segment FE 563 563 548 548 531 531
Observations 166,741 166,741 163,014 163,014 158,033 158,033
R2 0.187 0.168 0.186 0.167 0.178 0.159
Adjusted R2 0.180 0.160 0.179 0.160 0.170 0.152
Note: This table reports robustness tests on our main BDD regression results in Table 2 based on Equation 6 and
includes some variations on the exclusion around the capital city. In order to avoid capturing the break between
the capital city and the hinterlands, we exclude 50, 75 and 100 km (instead of 20 km) around each capital city
from our sample. To prevent misassignment of detected nightlights between countries due to blooming, we exclude
3 km on each side of the national boundary. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km),
ruggedness (in % slope), % surface covered with water, mean annual temperature, minimum average temperature
during the coldest month, maximum average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C), crop caloric index,
annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km). Boundary segments corresponds to a buffer
of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length and are entirely nested within a restricted ethnic homeland based
on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). The observations are weighted such that each side of a segment
has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by boundary
segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A13: Border Discontinuity Estimation - Heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Nightlight Density in 2016 (Prob/Log)
Decentralization Democracy (Polity2) GDP per capita (World Bank 2016)
Mean 1990-2010 2010 Mean 1996-2016 2016 Split at median Split at mean
Prob Log Prob Log Prob Log Prob Log Prob Log Prob Log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
CAP × Non-Decentr. -0.045∗ -0.229∗ -0.041 -0.217 - - - - - - - -
(0.024) (0.125) (0.028) (0.146)
CAP × Decentralized -0.031 -0.121∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ - - - - - - - -
(0.021) (0.070) (0.017) (0.060)
CAP × Mixed -0.026∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ - - - - - - - -
(0.010) (0.047) (0.008) (0.032)
CAP × Autocracy - - - - -0.001 0.007 -0.017 -0.041 - - - -
(0.010) (0.042) (0.013) (0.049)
CAP × Democracy - - - - -0.064∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗ -0.027∗ -0.117∗∗ - - - -
(0.023) (0.114) (0.014) (0.051)
CAP × Mixed - - - - -0.019 -0.089∗ -0.041∗ -0.206∗ - - - -
(0.013) (0.053) (0.023) (0.117)
CAP × Underdeveloped - - - - - - - - -0.033∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗
0.011) (0.049) 0.015 0.072
CAP × Developed - - - - - - - - 0.012 0.013 0.020 0.046
(0.021) (0.083) 0.022 0.096
CAP × Mixed - - - - - - - - -0.049∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗ -0.027∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.017) (0.083) 0.014 0.057
Coefficient Tests Non-Decentralized = Decentralized Autocracy = Democracy High GDP = Low GDP
F-Statistic 0.23 0.68 0.21 0.01 6.66∗∗ 6.15∗∗ 0.27 1.18 4.67∗∗ 3.66∗∗ 5.62∗∗ 3.71∗
Polynomials for: distance from the border × country × ethnicity (302 groups columns (1)-(4) and 305 groups columns (5)-(12))
3rd order x x x x x x x x x x x x
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE 35 35 35 35 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Segment FE 563 563 563 563 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569
Observations 166,833 166,833 166,833 166,833 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620 168,620
R2 0.190 0.169 0.190 0.169 0.189 0.169 0.189 0.169 0.189 0.169 0.189 0.169
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.162 0.182 0.162 0.182 0.161 0.182 0.161 0.182 0.161 0.182 0.161
Note: This table reports the heterogeneity test corresponding to our main BDD regression results based on Equation
6. For this purpose we categorize all boundaries as either delimiting two relatively decentralized, democratic or
developed countries and interact the respective dummies with log distance from the capital city. In columns (1)-(4),
we group boundaries based on the 20-year arithmetic and 2010 level of the decentralization index, in columns (5)-(8)
based on the 20-year mean and 2016 level of the Polity2 score and in columns (9)-(12) based on the median and
the mean of the 2016 GDP per capita value. We report the F-tests on the equality of the respective coefficients.
In order to avoid capturing the break between the capital city and the hinterlands, we exclude 20 km around each
capital city from our sample. To prevent misassignment of detected nightlights between countries due to blooming,
we exclude 3 km on each side of the border. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km),
ruggedness (in % slope), % surface covered with water, mean annual temperature, minimum average temperature
during the coldest month, maximum average temperature during the warmest month (in ◦C), crop caloric index,
annual precipitation (in mm), longitude and latitude (projected in km). Boundary segments corresponds to a buffer
of 25 km around border pieces of 50 km line length and are entirely nested within a restricted ethnic homeland based
on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). The observations are weighted such that each side of a segment
has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered by boundary
segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A14: Channel Analysis: Supplementary Results on Political Attitude
BDD Model with dependent variable z-score of:
Trust in Trust in Voter National
Ruling Opposition Turnout (vs Ethnic)
Party Party Identity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Distance from 0.169∗∗∗ 0.023 0.232∗∗∗ 0.039
the Capital City (0.060) (0.052) (0.051) (0.049)
Polynomials for: distance from the border
3rd order x x x x
Household Cov. YES YES YES YES
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES
Country × Round FE 67 67 70 68
Segment FE 140 140 140 140
Observations 7,794 7,809 7,702 8,007
R2 0.186 0.083 0.112 0.137
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.057 0.086 0.113
Note: This table reports the supplementary regressions on the impact of isolation from the capital city on the
perception of political leaders and accountability. The ‘Household Cov.’ include: age, age squared and sex of
respondent. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km), longitude and latitude (projected
in km) and whether the household is in an urban or rural setting. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to trust
into the ruling and opposition party respectively. Column (3) to voter turnout and column (4) to the extent
to which the respondent identifies with the nation rather than the ethnicity. All models are BDD regressions
using ‘Segment FE’ for boundary segments of 50 km length with a buffer of 25 km that are nested within an
ethnic homelands based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). All observations are weighted such that
each side of a segment has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual. Standard errors in paranthesis
are clustered by Afrobarometer cluster and boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A15: Channel Analysis: Afrobarometer Placebo Tests
BDD Model with dependent variable z-score of:
Public Trust Corrupt Perform Trust Trust Voter National Educ News Checks
Goods Leader Percept Eval Rule Oppos Turnout Identity Level Reader Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Log Distance from -0.064∗ 0.173∗∗ -0.070 0.226∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.064 0.122∗∗∗ 0.070 0.064 -0.092 -0.147∗∗
the Capital City (0.038) (0.071) (0.068) (0.105) (0.081) (0.070) (0.027) (0.068) (0.090) (0.083) (0.059)
Log Distance from 0.059∗ -0.024 0.023 0.080 0.012 0.062 0.041 0.037 0.003 0.097 -0.077
the Placebo City (0.031) (0.071) (0.074) (0.124) (0.076) (0.066) (0.028) (0.061) (0.083) (0.070) (0.055)
Placebo Tests CoefCapitalCity = CoefPlaceboCity
F-Statistic 15.50∗∗∗ 8.49∗∗∗ 4.27∗∗ 3.51∗ 7.00∗∗∗ 0.0 9.82∗∗∗ 0.46 1.29 11.90∗∗∗ 2.16
Polynomials for: distance from the border
3rd order x x x x x x x x x x x
Household Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Geography Cov. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country × Round FE 70 70 71 71 67 67 70 68 71 71 71
Segment FE 70 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Observations 8,053 7,601 6,525 6,414 7,590 7,598 7,501 7,802 8,096 7,902 7,556
R2 0.624 0.207 0.190 0.229 0.192 0.085 0.114 0.135 0.315 0.197 0.163
Adjusted R2 0.614 0.183 0.162 0.202 0.168 0.058 0.087 0.110 0.296 0.173 0.137
Note: This table reports the BDD placebo tests corresponding to the Afrobarometer regressions in Table 6, 7
and A14. We report the respective F-tests on the equality of the coefficients. The ‘Household Cov.’ include: age,
age squared and sex of respondent. The ‘Geographical Cov.’ include: distance from the coast (in km), longitude
and latitude (projected in km) and whether the household is in an urban or rural setting. The BDD sample is
restricted to a buffer of 25 km around the shared national boundaries. The ‘Segment FE’ are nested within an
ethnic homeland based on the ‘Tribal Map of Africa’ (Murdock, 1959). The observations are weighted such that
each side of a segment has the same aggregated weight as its counterfactual. Standard errors in paranthesis are
clustered by Afrobarometer cluster and boundary segment. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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